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Executive summary 
This report reviews the context and options available to the Department of Social Service (DSS) in 
developing its data access strategy, and proposes future developments based upon international 
practice. The structure of the report is separated into 4 parts.  
Part I: context for the study 
Part I provides the context for the report, considering current practices, law and the wider strategic 
framework. It notes that DSS already has a number of data access mechanisms in place. In addition, 
there are a number of off-the-shelf solutions currently operating in Australia, which may be relevant 
to DSS. Three typical DSS user groups are identified and defined based on their statistical skills and 
understanding of DSS; ‘non-expert’ (general public, journalists, non-PhD students), ‘professional 
researchers’ (Australia-based academics and PhDs) and ‘other researchers’.  
Part II: international experience 
Considering first the operational perspective, the report uses the Five Safes structure to break down 
data access mechanisms into five separate components: the project purpose, the people, the 
settings, the level of detail in the data, and checks on any statistics produced. In respect of those 
elements: 
Project purpose 
 Data should be made available for research purposes if the expected benefit to society 
outweighs the potential loss of privacy for the individual; however, it is not clear that the 
claimed benefits are effectively realised. There is widespread agreement that data should 
only be used for statistical research and must be sanctioned by an appropriate authority. 
The design of the approval process can make a substantial difference to the effectiveness of 
data access, particularly if precedents or classes of project are used.  Data access 
agreements should encompass physical, time, environmental and behavioural elements, 
instructing the user to best practice; they often include much more but it is not clear that 
this is justified or wise.  
People 
 Traditionally users have been treated as customers of the service that the data owner 
delivers. More recent models have raised awareness of the importance of understanding the 
psychology of users and, if possible, building a ‘community of interest’ between data owners 
and users. This has been demonstrated, albeit in a small number of situations, to deliver 
improved security and greater usefulness as lower costs. It does require a greater 
commitment to training both researchers and data owners, but this is increasingly seen as 
best practice.  
Settings for data access solutions 
 Distributing data is well established and relatively uncontroversial. Concerns do arise over 
users’ ability to maintain their research environment appropriately, but there is little reliable 
evidence that this is a significant risk. For the most sensitive data the virtual RDC (vRDC) is 
almost universally seen as best practice; most vRDCs operate in very similar ways and most 
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hold fully detailed data with minimal de-identification carried out. Remote tabulation is a 
well-established technology, but Australia is currently leading the field in new 
developments. A number of organisations are now considering creating synthetic data for 
educational/training purposes. 
Level of detail in the data 
 This is a very mature field where off-the-shelf tools and a vast academic literature means 
that data can be created to any level of ‘safety’ desired. However, some recent authors have 
argued that the applications of the conceptual models is seriously flawed, and have 
demonstrated that a more evidential approach can generate both more secure and more 
user-friendly outcomes. 
Checks on the output 
 In the last ten years a new field of ‘output statistical disclosure control’ (OSDC) has 
developed, specifically to ensure that the results of research use of sensitive data do not 
breach confidentiality. vRDCs are more likely to use ‘principles-based’ OSDC, but this does 
require a commitment to training researchers. Distributed data solutions still tend to rely on 
sending users a set of instructions with the dataset. However, some modern training tools 
are being developed. 
The report also considers the wider institutional and ethical concepts. This has an important 
influence on the effectiveness of any operational solution, and it can lead to very different 
outcomes. The report contrasts two approaches to data access planning: the ‘traditional’ model and 
the ‘EDRU’ model. 
The traditional model is fundamentally defensive in nature; the focus is on the costs and risk to the 
data owner, and it assumes that the primary aim of any data access strategy is to prevent malicious 
misuse. This model therefore makes extensive use of worst-case scenarios and protection against 
hypothetical possibilities. The traditional model is default-closed; that is, it assumes that no access 
will be granted unless it can be proven to be safe. 
The evidence-based, default-open, risk-managed, user-centred (EDRU) model reverses almost all of 
these precepts. It is evidence-based: hypothetical possibilities have little or no place in decision-
making. It is default-open: data is assumed to be released, and the question for the data owner is 
how to manage confidentiality risks. It accepts that their data access choices are subjective and 
made in conditions of uncertainty, and that the relevant metric for costs and benefits is society, not 
the data owner; therefore, decision-making is a balance of subjective probabilities. Finally, it is user-
centred, focusing on the usefulness of outputs rather than the risk to the data owner.  
Breaches of confidentiality by the research community are extremely rare. It has been argued that 
the lack of breaches of confidentiality is evidence that the traditional model works well. As the 
traditional model has, until recently been the universal ethos for all data access solutions, this 
statement cannot be challenged. However, an increasing number of data access solutions adopting 
the EDRU ethos provides evidence that the traditional model has been over-cautious and missed 
opportunities to create synergy with the research community; as such it has not served society well. 
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This reports concludes that the EDRU ethos provides a more sustainable world-view and, on the 
limited evidence available, is more likely to provide a secure and useful data access solution; it also 
seems better suited to exploit the gains from increased data access by engaging with researchers 
more. The report acknowledges that this is very much a minority view, but a growing one which 
seems likely to become much more significant. 
Part III: mapping users and solutions for DSS 
Following the broad identification of user groups in Part I, and international understanding of good 
management of the user community in Part II, this section describes user groups in detail and the 
proposed data access solutions mapped to each user group: 
 Remote tabulation would serve the non-expert user group well; in the longer term, synthetic 
data may have value in educational contexts. 
 Expert researchers need access to micro level data; the full data with minimal de-
identification should be delivered through vRDCs, but Scientific Use Files (SUFs) with a lower 
level of detail in the data should also be part of DSS’ strategy. 
 For researchers working abroad or in private sector organisations, our recommendation is 
that the vRDC/SUF combination also suits this market. 
Institutional factors can have a strong influence on the effectiveness of operational decisions, and 
this report covers them separately. The recommendations made are based on the EDRU ethos and 
so many of them are at the edge of current knowledge about how to manage data access effectively; 
some of them may be seen as very radical. However, based on the experience of the last ten years, 
we expect that this approach will become more important, not less, and we believe this is a rare 
opportunity for DSS to lead such developments. 
Overarching issues which need to be addressed at the institutional level are: 
 Common operational issues: standardisation of both institutional and personal access 
agreements; classification of data types for mapping onto technical solutions; training 
institutional signatories about the data community and their role within it; developing 
training programs for researchers. 
 Attitudes: formal statement of intent for ‘default-open’ institutions, clarification of staff 
roles and duties within data accessibility, and a modern approach to risk management and 
the likelihood of human error. 
 Stakeholder management: developing a strong relationship with data providers and 
researchers to share findings, particularly in terms of developing whole-of-government 
solutions to data access in Australia.  
 Perceptions: early discussion with privacy campaigners and with users; the development of 
an advisory board with representatives from different institutions, the general public, 
journalists and privacy campaigners to discuss data sharing practice. 
The report notes that DSS has already gone a considerable way down this route, with high-profile 
statements about attitude and a draft Data Policy which conveys much of the EDRU ethos. These 
developments can be usefully augmented in a number of ways. 
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Part IV Implementation 
Part IV provides a roadmap for future development, based on the three user groups (plus 
overarching issues), considered over the short, medium and long term. The timing is based on both 
the natural order of changes, and the feasibility of targets. The list of proposed actions is long, but 
the elements should be complementary. The programme is also ambitious in its scope, but we 
believe this is feasible and will provide DSS with a solid base for an enviably coherent long-term 
strategic direction. 
The strategic roadmap provides short-term and long-term guidance on the following areas: 
 The creation of synthetic data files and associated metadata for Public Use Files 
 Development of TableBuilder for the dissemination of SUF and metadata 
 Simplifying the provision of SUFs and clarifying the access arrangements 
 Scoping a potential pilot for a virtual RDC for hosting detailed datasets with minimal de-
identification and 
 Institutional change promoting a positive ‘default open’ attitude amongst users, 
institutions, stakeholders and the public.  
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Definitions 
Definitions used in this report are as follows (note, these may differ slightly from similar definitions 
given elsewhere): 
Types of data 
 Microdata: individual unit records about a person or organisation, such as information 
collected from surveys or administrative data 
 Raw data: the source data collected by the Department 
 Identified data: data which includes information allowing the recipient to be directly known 
just from one or two fields in the data (such as name, or social security number) 
 De-identified data: data which includes sufficient detail to allow the data subject to be 
identified, but only with effort and with less certainty (for example, a combination of 
gender, age, type of employer, salary range and disability status) 
 Anonymous data: data which does not include sufficient detail to allow the data subject to 
be identified, under any reasonable conditions 
 Confidentialisation: the act of reducing the likelihood or harm of re-identification by 
reducing detail or perturbing the dataset 
 Confidential data: data which, for legal and/or ethical reasons, must not be made available 
to anyone who does not have appropriate authorisation 
 Sensitive data: data where release to an unauthorised person is likely to cause non-
negligible harm or distress to the data subject; for the purposes of this report, we assume 
that all sensitive data is also confidential 
 Protected information: a specific term used in various ways in Australian legislation, that 
includes referring to information ‘about a person’ but not necessarily identifying a person; 
anonymous data can still be ‘protected information’ under Australian law 
Disclosure and breaches 
 Unauthorised disclosure: the unauthorised release of information about an identified data 
subject 
 Statistical disclosure control (SDC): applying statistical measures to (a) determine if there is 
a substantive risk of unauthorised disclosure in a dataset or publication, and (b) make 
changes to the data or publication to reduce that risk 
 Input SDC: the application of SDC methods to raw data to reduce data risk before it is 
released to the users 
 Output SDC (OSDC): the application of SDC methods to potential publications after the 
analysis has been carried out, to guard against residual risk 
 Breach of confidentiality: the release of identified or de-identified data to an unauthorised 
system, environment or person; a breach of confidentiality may not mean a disclosure as it 
will depend on the circumstances 
 Breach of procedure: failure to follow appropriate operating procedures, irrespective of 
whether a breach of confidentiality occurs  
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Forms of access: 
 Distributed data: sending microdata to users under licence, to analyse on their own 
machines 
 Distributed access: restricting the physical location of the data, but allowing users in others 
locations to carry out analysis and take retain statistical results (but not microdata) 
 Table server: a system which allows users to generate their own tables from the data 
flexibly, but without seeing the source data; a form of distributed access 
 Remote job server: a system allowing a range of complex analyses to be carried out, not just 
tabulations, without seeing the source data; a table server is a remote job server which has 
only one function 
 Remote access: a system which allows users to ‘see’ and manipulate the source data 
 Research data centre (RDC): a restricted access facility where users can manipulate the 
source data without restriction as if on their own computers; but the environment is made 
secure so that users cannot bring information into or take data out of the facility without 
approval, and additional services (such as internet access) are normally very restricted; 
typically provided by on-site access, where the facility is hosted on the organisation’s 
premises 
 Virtual RDC or Remote RDC (vRDC): an RDC where technology is used to provide equivalent 
security to a physical site and to separate the RDC from the actual location of the data, such 
as SURE 
 Public use file (PUF): data file without restrictions on use or onward access 
 Scientific use file (SUF): data file which retains some non-negligible confidentiality risk and 
so therefore has circulation restricted to authorised users for specific research purposes 
 Secure use file (SecUF): data file which contains non-negligible confidential information 
therefore circulation and use is restricted to authorised users for specific purposes 
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Part I Project context 
1. Context, aims and objectives for the Data Access Project 
1.1 Department of Social Services data access strategy 
The Department of Social Services (DSS) “aspire[s] to be Australia’s pre-eminent social policy agency. 
[The Department’s] mission is to improve the lifetime wellbeing of people and families in Australia”1. 
One part of that mission is providing external users with access to statistics and raw data collected 
by DSS, so that third parties can potentially enhance DSS activities with their own research, and 
generally boost service provision from Federal, state and local council programs and non-
government services. 
The public benefits expected to arise from this project are: 
 greater ability of the general public to identify useful information specific to their 
circumstances, such as small area data 
 improved capability for professional researchers using detailed information to produce 
policy-relevant analyses 
 streamlining of DSS’ data access procedures, including integration with the wider Australian 
Government strategy 
 better understanding of user needs by DSS 
 methodological commentary and quality control arising from an expanded pool of expert 
users and 
 greater understanding and acceptance of data collection and use by DSS. 
This strategy is consistent with Australian Government Public Data Policy (AGPDP)2 and associated 
report Public Sector Data Management (PSDM)3, which provide high-level guidance on how public 
sector data resources are to be managed for the benefit of the community. DSS is investigating how 
to best implement the AGPDP, particularly in respect of access to confidential or sensitive microdata. 
Some practical elements of this investigation are already in place or are being piloted, by the 
Department on its own and in collaboration with other agencies (such as the Multi-Agency Data 
Integration Project).  
A key element of this strategy is developing a Trusted User Model to manage access to confidential 
data. This has proven difficult for governments in the past, not just in Australia but around the 
world. Solutions are typically over-cautious and fail to encourage users to engage positively with the 
service. The AGPDP and PSDM propose a conceptual framework which challenges traditional 
perspectives on data access, and encourages data access to develop along ‘modern’ lines: the 
evidence-based, default-open, risk-managed, user-centred (EDRU) model which is increasingly seen 
as a more effective and cost-effective strategy for delivering data access. The Australian Bureau of 
                                                          
1
 DSS website “About the Department”. https://www.dss.gov.au/about-the-department.  
2
 Australian Government (2015) Australian Government Public Data Policy. Office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
https://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/aust_govt_public_data_policy_statement_1.pdf  
3
 Australian Government (2015) Public Sector Data Management. Office of the Prime Minister and Cabinet. 
https://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/public_sector_data_mgt_project.pdf  
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Statistics has already redesigned its data access strategy along EDRU lines, and DSS has already made 
moves towards adopting a similar approach. 
The Trusted User Model is being developed to provide a platform for providing access to relevant 
administrative data to “trusted” users. DSS is committed to developing a Trusted User Model in 
alignment with the AGPDP alongside coordinating similar activities across organisations; to help 
develop a sustainable system.  
1.2 Objectives of the project 
The Department has commissioned the University of the West of England to:  
 Review international good practice in data access 
 Consider how the needs of different user groups accessing DSS data might be met by 
alternative (technical and organisational) solutions; particular attention should be paid to 
institutional relationships 
 Identify where tools and practices already exist which DSS uses or may be able to exploit; 
and where gaps in policy or practice exist 
 Recommend a development path, focusing particularly on access to confidential microdata 
and the development of the Trusted User Model and 
 Advise the Department with practical proposals on how such a development path might be 
implemented, including timing and priorities. 
While the focus is on meeting the needs of DSS and its data users, consideration should also be given 
to integration with other Australian initiatives, to identify potential areas for collaboration and avoid 
creating data solution silos in different Departments. 
This report considers how to make best use of the microdata that DSS holds; that is, record level 
data. Access to this data allows users to make their own analyses of the data. At one end of the 
spectrum, effective use of the microdata this might be achieved by allowing journalists to create 
their own tabulations of the data, but without ever seeing the source data. At the other end, expert 
statistical analysts may have unrestricted access to identifiable microdata (subject to legislation such 
as the Privacy Act 1988 and security requirements imposed by DSS when receiving data), with only 
their publications being subject to confidentiality checks. Standard statistical analyses produced by 
DSS or bespoke statistical services provided by DSS are not considered in this report. 
1.3 Structure of the report 
The remainder of Part I summarises the current position in respect of DSS’s interests and activities. 
Part II reviews international practice, both on operational issues and in terms of wider institutional 
issues. It then introduces the tripartite structure (operational issues, institutional matters, public 
relations) which will be used for the proposals and recommendations. 
Part III reviews the specific combinations of options and draft provisional recommendations. It also 
considers the wider institutional context, and where DSS may need attitudinal statements. 
Finally, Part IV proposes specific actions and a timetable to achieve the recommendations in Part III.  
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2. Relevant considerations 
2.1 Current facilities and solutions 
2.1.1 DSS paths to access 
General access to data 
DSS data is provided widely to universities and other institutions on request subject to meeting 
legislative requirements under social security law, family assistance law etc. and the Privacy Act 
1988. The information is typically provided after a Public Interest Certificate (PIC) or Protected 
Information Disclosure (PID) has been approved under the legislation which required the collection 
of the data for Government purposes. The data is supplied to the researcher with restrictions on 
what the researcher can do with it. We will refer to these datasets as Scientific Use Files (SUFs), to 
contrast them with Public Use Files (PUFs) which are unrestricted. DSS does not at present produce 
PUFs. A third type of data is a Secure Use File (SecUF), a detailed data file made available to 
researchers remotely through facilities controlled by the data owner. Currently DSS does not 
produce SecUFs. 
To the casual observer, DSS does not appear to make its data available for third-party analysis. There 
is no statement on the website about access to data, a general data strategy, or to indicate that data 
might be available.  
National Centre for Longitudinal Data 
An exception to the general invisibility of data is DSS longitudinal data resource. DSS created and 
maintains several longitudinal studies, the earliest from 2001 and the most recent from 2013. These 
are managed by DSS’ National Centre for Longitudinal Data (NCLD4). The microdata is distributed to 
researchers through a transparent and apparently long-established process, described in detail on 
DSS website.  
The key features of this distributed data approach relevant to this project are: 
 Data are released as SUFs with two levels of confidentialisation: ‘General Release’ (lower 
risk) and ‘Unconfidentialised’ (higher risk). 
 Both datasets have to be kept on systems with defined security standards; the 
Unconfidentialised datasets require additional electronic and physical locks; both are subject 
to DSS spot-checks with three hours’ notice. 
 Users can apply for an individual access agreement. 
 Alternatively, they can apply through their organisation’s licensing agreement with DSS (for 
some categories such as Honours students this is the only route). 
 When an organisation has an agreement with DSS, a data manager needs to be appointed at 
the organisation to take responsibility for the implementation of procedures. 
 Eligible users are Australian academics and students, research organisations, government 
users; all research must be for public benefit.  
                                                          
4
 https://www.dss.gov.au/about-the-department/national-centre-for-longitudinal-data  
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 The same eligibility criteria apply to overseas researchers, but they are only able to access 
the lower risk General Release files, not the Unconfidentialised files.  
 The finest detail in the Unconfidentialised files is date of birth, which is very detailed by 
international standards. 
 There have been a small (single-digit) number of breaches of procedure from using these 
data since 2003; mistakes and poor handling practices are counted as breaches; it is possible 
that some of these might have led to breaches of confidentiality, but the impact of any 
breaches appears to have been contained.  
Development projects 
DSS is participating in two relevant development projects. 
The Multi-Agency Data Integration Project (MADIP) is a collaboration between DSS, the Australian 
Taxation Office, the Department of Health, the Department of Human Services and the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS), with the latter leading the project. This project shares data between the 
agencies to allow personal and health data to be combined for policy analysis. The Trusted User 
Model being developed for that project has a significant potential overlap with this project; hence 
developments in MADIP will be important for recommendations on this project. However, ABS is 
already committed to the EDRU model of data access, and so differences across projects should be a 
matter of degree rather than principles.  
DSS is developing its own Trusted User Model project. This project will provide research access to 
the income support dataset via a virtual Research Data Centre (vRDC), the Secure Unified Research 
Environment (SURE) of the Sax Institute. Proof of concept in terms of physical access to systems and 
agreement on approval of projects is underway, with user agreements based on personal contracts. 
The ambition is that the final Trusted User Model will reflect the EDRU model and, where possible, 
be compatible with developments across government. The findings of the Data Access Project will 
directly feed into the post-pilot implementation of the Trusted User Model project, and so this 
report will pay particular attention to the management of vRDCs. 
2.1.2 Data access resources within or accessible to the Australian Government 
At this stage, there are several data access systems in Australia which could either be exploited or 
used as precedents for DSS solutions. 
Distributed data solutions are: 
 NCLD, already in operation at DSS for research access to DSS longitudinal studies  
 Confidentialised Unit Record Files or CURFs, the ABS’ microdata files for distribution and 
 data.gov.au, the Australian Government website which facilitates the distribution of data. 
On-site solution is: 
 In-postings, used by the ABS to provide access to an on-site RDC (the Australian Data Lab or 
ADL) for government researchers.  
Distributed access solutions are: 
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 TableBuilder, a tabulation tool designed by SpaceTime Research for the ABS, providing real-
time statistical disclosure control before generating the tables; it has generated considerable 
interest amongst other statistical institutes 
 Secure Unified Research Environment (SURE), a vRDC run by the Sax Institute which 
appears to run along similar lines to the dominant model in the rest of the world 
 Virtual Microdata Laboratory, a remote access version of the Australian Data Lab under 
development and piloting by the ABS and 
 Remote Access Data Laboratory (RADL), a remote-job server for more detailed CURFs, run 
by the ABS.  
In terms of the institutional framework, there are examples of both institutional and personal 
contracts in these systems. The RADL provides some good examples of where problems can arise, 
particularly when the relationship between the researchers and the data provider is not strongly 
positive. 
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2.2 User groups 
DSS has identified a number of user groups who need to be considered for this project. These are 
categorised in Table 1, along with provisional solutions to help in considering alternative solutions. 
‘Knowledge’ is classified by whether users have a good understanding of DSS activities, and whether 
they have strong statistical skills. The possibility of contracting is based on the practicality, 
credibility, meaningfulness to the user, and difficulty of enforcement. 
Table 1 Summary of DSS user groups 
Group Interest Assumed 
knowledge and 
statistical skill 
Contract possible? Potential 
solutions Personal Institutional 
General public Simple 
tabulations 
Very little No No Remote 
tabulation 
Journalists Complex 
tabulations 
Good 
knowledge of 
DSS, limited 
statistics 
Possibly Possibly Remote 
tabulation 
Honours/Masters 
students 
Microdata for 
analysis 
Little 
knowledge of 
DSS, basic 
statistics 
Possibly No Synthetic data, 
remote 
tabulation 
PhDs Microdata for 
analysis 
Good 
knowledge of 
DSS, good 
statistics 
Yes Possibly Distributed 
microdata, 
vRDC 
Academics 
(university and 
research institutes) 
Microdata for 
analysis 
Good 
knowledge of 
DSS, good 
statistics 
Yes Yes Distributed 
microdata, 
vRDC 
Government 
researchers 
Tabulations, 
microdata 
Good 
knowledge of 
DSS, good 
statistics 
Yes Yes Distributed 
microdata, 
vRDC 
Private sector 
researchers 
Tabulations, 
microdata 
Good 
knowledge of 
DSS, good 
statistics 
Possibly Yes Remote 
tabulation, 
distributed 
microdata 
Foreign researchers Tabulations, 
microdata 
Good 
knowledge of 
DSS, good 
statistics 
Possibly Possibly Remote 
tabulation, 
distributed 
microdata 
On this basis, the report classifies these further as ‘non-expert’ (general public, journalists, non-PhD 
students), ‘professional researchers’ (Australia-based academics and PhDs) and ‘other researchers’. 
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2.3 Legal framework 
2.3.1 Laws covering access 
DSS data is covered by several laws and determinations reflecting the range of activities carried out 
by the department.  This part discusses laws which discuss the governance of data collection. 
Although the premise of the laws are similar, there are differences within the acts. The laws which 
predominately affect data governance are briefly outlined and discussed below.  
Social Security (Administration) Act 1999 (SS(A) Act) 
This Act addresses ‘protected information’- information which is about a person but which does not 
necessarily identify a person; hence even anonymous microdata is still covered. The gateway for 
research access is provided in s202(2C), which allows research use by individuals in “matters of 
relevance to a Department”. S208(1)(a) offers an alternative approach as the Secretary of the 
Department may provide the information “…to such persons and for such purposes as the Secretary 
determines”, by providing a ‘Public Interest Certificate’. Moreover, the Secretary can develop 
guidelines to settle matters of access in both cases and classes of cases. S2081)(a) appears to be the 
clause under which research data access is given. However, the guidelines specified in relation to the 
access clause (defined in the Social Security (Public Interest Certificate Guidelines) (DSS) 
Determination 2015) make clear that, for the Certificate to be granted, research still has to be 
relevant to the department.  
The Act also allows DSS to have an institutional arrangement with another government department, 
where data is shared for the purposes of that department. 
Note that, in case of breaches of confidentiality, the intention of the miscreant has to be taken into 
consideration (s204). On the other hand, asking for protected information to be provided unlawfully 
is an offence. In other words, the law appears to provide sensible protection against mistakes whilst 
explicitly criminalising the “can I borrow your data without authority” attitude. Both of these are 
useful messages to send to researchers. 
A New Tax System (Family Assistance) (Administration) Act 1999 
This provides research access to data under very similar wording (s167) to the SS(A) Act s207. Again, 
the Secretary is allowed to approve guidelines on access and classes of access. The Family Assistance 
(Public Interest Certificate Guidelines) Determination 2015 provides more detail on what will count 
as sufficiently important to be ‘in the public interest’. 
This Act does not directly provide for research access to data (unlike s202(2C) of the above 
SS(A)Act), but it does have the same references to error, strict liability, and encouraging others to 
break the law. 
Privacy Act 1988 
The privacy act extends to all data collected by the Australian government and affects much data 
collected by the private sector including credit, health and insurance information. 
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2.3.2 Ethical approval 
Ethical approval is not required by DSS where administrative data already exists or is part of routine 
data collecting related to an application for government support  (e.g. when data is collected when 
someone applies for a pension). Ethical approval is however required when conducting a new survey 
or linking new data which obtains further data related to existing data. 
2.3.3 Organisations working in data privacy 
As well as legal constraints on data access, and ethical constraints raised by the Department, the 
success of data access initiatives may be affected by the support or opposition of organisations with 
an interest in data privacy.  
On the anti-access front, one organisation is the Australian Privacy Foundation, who in the past has 
made some extreme statements about data access (for example over the ABS’ plans to retain name 
and addresses on the Census data)5. 
On the more pro-access side, the Menzies Foundation has been commissioning work looking at 
public concerns and preferences over linking government and health data.6 
Finally, the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) may be a powerful ally or a 
major limit on activities. The EDRU approach is likely to be welcomed by the OAIC because it tends 
to produce demonstrably more secure solutions at lower cost; this has been the experience in other 
countries.  
In all of these cases the lesson from international experience is that early and meaningful 
engagement with interested parties matters as much as compliance with legislative requirements. 
2.4 Wider strategic framework 
In terms of data access, it is important to build on previous developments. First, this enables one to 
learn from others. Second, and more importantly in government, following precedents enables 
difficult decisions to be taken more easily. For example, the fact that the PIC/PID requests and the 
NCLD appear to have been securely providing very detailed data for several years without 
confidentiality problems suggests that (a) potential problems are manageable in practice, and (b) 
DSS has the experience manage risk effectively. A third reason for looking to other Departments is 
that several bodies are working through the same issues, all perhaps driven by the AGPDP. This 
provides a unique opportunity to consider whole-of-government approaches. While exactly the 
same solution may not suit all parties, there should be enough commonality to avoid re-inventing 
wheels, or building data sharing systems on principles or organisational attitudes that are 
incompatible. 
Therefore in section we consider systems in existence as well as potentially useful precedents. 
                                                          
5
 ‘ABS slammed for breach of trust over 'intrusive' 2016 Census data matching plan’. Financial Review (2016), 9
th
 March 
6
 Menzies Foundation. (2013). Public Support of Data Linkage for Better Health. 
http://www.menziesfoundation.org.au/pdf/Data%20Linkage_16aug13/Menzies%20Foundation_Public%20support%20for
%20data-based%20research.pdf    
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Since the beginning of 2015, the ABS has developed strategic data management plans which bear 
substantial similarities to the needs of DSS. Traditionally the ABS was seen by statistical 
organisations in other countries as one of the more conservative bodies, but the strategic decision to 
adopt the EDRU approach and use the Five Safes (see below) as an organising framework means that 
the ABS is currently, in our opinion, a world leader in modern approaches to data access. This makes 
the ABS approach a useful precedent for DSS’ data access strategy, as well as a potential partner in 
developing a whole-of-government approach. The change in perspective has not necessarily 
required wholesale changes in the specific solutions (for example, distributed data solutions are 
essentially unchanged), but has radically changed the decision-making process and the way different 
elements of the data access strategy knit together7.  
In a process linked to the Policy Statement, the Australian Productivity Commission in undertaking 
an inquiry into the collection and dissemination of data, including research strategy, across all levels 
of government. Preliminary responses are due by the end of July 2016, after this project has 
completed. Although the Productivity Commission (PC) primarily deals with data relating to 
businesses rather than individuals, and so the stakeholder group is different, information on the PC’s 
perception of data access may usefully enable DSS to start building a wider coalition of knowledge.  
In November 2015 the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, sponsors of the AGPDP, 
established a ‘Public Data Branch’ which ‘aims to maximise the economic, social and environmental 
benefits from the use of data whilst maintaining a strong focus on and commitment to privacy and 
security’8. At present this branch appears to be mainly concerned with making better use of open 
(unrestricted) data, but this branch also has an interest in cross-government developments and 
coordination of confidential data access.  
Finally, in 2014 the National Health and Medical Research Council produced a set of ‘Principles’ of 
data access9. Although pre-dating the AGPDP, the broad ideas are very similar to the subsequent 
AGPDP, and have already been suggested as a possible model for adoption by other bodies10.  
                                                          
7
 A similar process took place in the UK Office for National Statistics in 2011: a Data Access Policy was produced which 
changed systems very little in practice, but put all of ONS’ procedures into one conceptual framework and showed how this 
could be integrated with legal obligations to develop specific guidelines for future changes. See ONS (2011) Data Access 
Policy. 
8
 https://www.dpmc.gov.au/pmc/about-pmc/core-priorities/public-data-branch-within-dpmc  
9
 National Health and Medical Research Council (2014) Draft Principles for accessing publicly funded data 
https://consultations.nhmrc.gov.au/files/consultations/drafts/draftprinciplesaccessingpubliclyfundeddata141209.pdf  
10
 The Wellcome Trust (2015) Enabling data linkage for better public health research. 
https://wellcome.ac.uk/sites/default/files/enabling-data-linkage-to-maximise-value-of-public-health-research-data-phrdf-
mar15.pdf  
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Part II International practice 
3. Introduction 
This part reviews international practice with the aim of identifying relevant precedents, experiences, 
and solutions for DSS. 
Note that the aim is to ‘review’ rather than ‘identify best practice’. This is an evolving field, and while 
there is some agreement on current best practice, there is more agreement on what works and what 
doesn’t work in different environments. Hence, for example, Eurostat uses the phrase ‘Expert advice 
is that…’ rather than ‘Best practice is…’ This seems to us more helpful then trying to identify a gold 
standard, particularly when the preferred outcome is likely to be sensitive to the specific 
environment. 
3.1 Sources of information 
Practice and theory in access to government data is dominated by National Statistical Institutes 
(NSIs) generating personal (non-health) and business data, such as the Office for National Statistics 
in the UK, the Census Bureau in the US, and the Australian Bureau of Statistics. Whilst other 
government bodies also release data, NSIs are often influential in setting the standards under which 
government bodies release data. Almost all of the literature on statistical aspects of data access is 
targeted at and/or sponsored by NSIs; and development of data access solutions is mostly driven by 
NSIs. In some countries data archives or research institutes have played an important role in 
improving access to data, but these work closely with NSIs when dealing with government data. 
NSIs also generally produce multiple types of data for analysis, and so may try to develop coherent 
data access strategies across a range of customer types. This is the relevant model for DSS to follow. 
Hence, although the discussion below does make use of examples from other government bodies, 
much of the discussion references NSIs. 
Other than NSIs, most discussion about data access arises from epidemiology/public health. 
Research in this field largely focuses on three topics: data linking; consent; and public perceptions of 
data use. The first two topics are not directly relevant; they were reviewed in the 2015 Public Health 
Research Data Forum report Enabling Data Linkage to Maximise the Value of Public Health Research 
Data11, and will not be covered here in detail. That report noted that public health was lagging 
significantly behind social sciences in practical matters; that is, most of the activity in public health is 
focused on ethical issues, and the practicalities of data access (alternative technical solutions, 
researcher management, stakeholder management, risk evaluation) do not, generally, reflect the 
advances made in access to personal and business data this century. 
Public health is much more advanced then social science in the understanding of public perceptions 
of data access. Important studies have shown that public opinion is typically hostile by default to 
government data sharing but very amenable to persuasion; and the successful management of 
public opinion is, in some ways, more important than any technical solution for providing access.  
                                                          
11
 Wellcome Trust (2015), ibid. 
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In summary, the following review draws mainly on the experience and perspectives of NSIs who 
drive much of the work in this area, supported by examples from other government departments 
providing personal microdata, data archives and research institutes, and public health bodies. 
It should also be noted that the evidence base is sparse. Breaches of confidentiality amongst 
research users of government data are exceedingly rare; and almost every government release 
strategy has the same, defensive, conceptual framework. As a result, identifying cause and effect in 
public data protection is very difficult, and relies heavily on expert opinion. 
Much of the recent thinking about effective data management has come from the vRDC world, 
where different data strategies have been tried; there are also a handful of examples from the world 
of distributed data.  Evidence does not show that breaches of confidentiality have been prevented – 
this is almost impossible to show – but that the perceived likelihood of a breach has been reduced, 
while user value has not been reduced and costs have not increased. As a result, when the report 
comments ‘evidence shows…’ this is a shorthand for ‘what little empirical evidence there is, is 
supportive of…’ 
It is slightly easier to determine what is perceived to be ‘good practice’, and where there are 
differences between schools of thought. Note however that these perceptions are also largely 
unevidenced. 
3.2 Structure 
The second section in this part looks at the practical elements of data access solution, following the 
‘Five Safes’ structure widely used for analysing data access solutions. This breaks down complex 
solutions into five independent but linked questions around the managerial and statistical 
components, enabling one part of the data puzzle to be addressed at a time. These are covered in 
Section 4. 
Such practical information needs to be put in the institutional context. One of the great changes in 
recent years has been the realisation that the effectiveness of any practical implementation is highly 
dependent upon the institutional attitudes that pervade the organisation: whether the perspective is 
default-open or default-closed, whether worst-case scenario planning should be used, what role do 
users play in the decision-making process, and so on. 
Allied to this is the wider topic of managing public expectations; this may seem like an operational 
issues – and in many cases is so – but increasingly it is recognised that pro-active PR can bring 
significant benefits, and to be effectively pro-active requires an accommodating organisational 
stance. 
Hence, Section 5 considers all of these overarching issues. It differs from the second section where 
there is broad agreement on what works. There is much less agreement on institutional 
perspectives, largely because it has not been addressed, and so this section has less of an evidence 
base to work with. 
Finally in this Part II, Section 6 draws together the operational aspects, internal perceptions, and 
external perceptions to provide an overview the strategic planning process. This provides the 
framework for the next two Parts looking at specific solutions. 
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4. Components of a data access solution 
4.1 The five safes12 
The Five Safes is a framework for organising thinking about data access. The basic premise of the 
framework is that data access can be seen as a set of five ‘risk dimensions’: safe projects, safe 
people, safe data, safe settings, safe outputs. Each dimension provokes a question about access: 
Safe projects Is this use of the data appropriate? 
Safe people Can the researchers be trusted to use it in an appropriate manner? 
Safe data Is there a disclosure risk in the data itself? 
Safe settings Does the access facility limit unauthorised use? 
Safe outputs Are the statistical results non-disclosive? 
These dimensions embody a range of values: ‘safety’ is a measure, not a state. For example, ‘safe 
data’ is the dimension under which the safety of the data is being assessed; it does not mean that 
the data is non-disclosive. Nor does it necessarily specify how the dimensions should be calibrated. 
‘Safe data’ could be classified using a statistical model of re-identification risk, or a much more 
subjective scale, from ‘very low’ to ‘very high’. The point is that the user has some idea of ‘more safe 
data’ and ‘less safe data’. 
Any data access solution needs to consider all five dimensions (even if simply to note that a 
particular dimension is not relevant), which is done in Part III of this report. However, each element 
can be reviewed independently for risk characteristics and evidence of appropriate practice; this is 
how we use the framework in this section, evaluating each of the individual elements. 
4.2 Settings: options for access 
There are four options for providing access to data:  
1. Secure on-site research facilities (research data centres or RDCs) 
2. Distributed data (licensing) 
3. Distributed analysis, broken down into 
a. Remote tabulation 
b. Remote job servers 
c. Remote or virtual RDCs 
d. Analysis services and  
4. Synthetic data.  
                                                          
12
 For a detailed discussion of the Five Safes, see Desai T., Ritchie F., and Welpton R. (2016) The Five Safes: designing data 
access for research. Working papers in Economics no. 1601, University of the West of England, Bristol. January 
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The first option relates to access which requires the user to be in the same physical place as the 
data, in a facility controlled by the data owner. As these are usually implemented nowadays by 
virtualised technology (and so the limitation to be in a physical research facility is the choice of the 
data owner) we will consider these to be a subset of option 3, distributed analysis. 
4.2.1 Distributed data 
Sending data to users has been the dominant solution in social science and epidemiology for 
providing access to research data for most of the last fifty years. As such, current good practice is 
well-established and uncontroversial: 
 Determine whether the data to be released is a ‘public use file’ (PUF) or ‘scientific use file’ 
(SUF); the former can be disseminated without significant disclosure risk, whereas the latter 
are assumed to retain some non-negligible risk and so have access limited to approved users 
 For SUFs, validate the identity of the user 
 For SUFs, require a commitment to a level of IT security where the data will be held and 
used 
 Distribute the data to the user (via a physical medium or download); for SUFs an 
acknowledgement of receipt should be required 
 For SUFs, the data may also be encrypted; if so, the encryption key should be sent by an 
alternative medium (such as SMS or email) once receipt is acknowledged and 
 For SUFs, provide advice on management of the data and the publication of outputs.  
However in practice, not all of these steps are followed. For example it is rare but not unheard of for 
both data and encryption keys to be sent by email to the same address. Thankfully incidence of this 
has become increasingly rare practice with no major data-holding organisations presently making 
this mistake. 
The advantage of distributing the data is that the data owner can concentrate on a specific statistical 
problem (making the data safe enough for this user group) and not on the need to think about the 
research process. If a fixed set of data files are produced and made available to multiple users, then 
the cost of that production can be spread over many units; this is the case for PUFs and for some, 
but not all, SUFs. 
The concern that arises from distributed data is the lack of control of the distributing organisations 
in respect of SUFs. These arise from concerns about storage, appropriate use, and unauthorised 
sharing. For example, users of data downloaded from the UK Data Service under the End User 
Licence (EUL) are merely required [edited T&Cs]13: 
to use the data in accordance with the EUL and to notify the UK Data Service of any breach 
you are aware of [summary text, condition 1] 
to give access to the data collections only to registered users with a registered use (who have 
accepted the terms and conditions, including any relevant further conditions) [condition 6] 
                                                          
13
 Edited extract. Full text: http://ukdataservice.ac.uk/media/455131/cd137-enduserlicence.pdf  
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to ensure that the means of access to the data (such as passwords) are kept secure and not 
disclosed to anyone else [condition 7] 
Most distributed data providers have similar terms and conditions. 
There seems to be very little evidence about how well such T&Cs are followed, but there is a general 
impression amongst data managers with experience of universities that:  
 academic researchers do mean stick to the purposes for which they applied for the data, but 
projects may ‘drift’ over time 
 there is a strong suspicion that academics do not delete the data after project completion, 
as ‘research’ is never complete 
 disclosure control of outputs is not applied effectively in academia and 
 academics are over-confident in their own abilities to manage data securely.  
In contrast, government researchers appear to place their trust in government IT systems and seem 
more inclined to follow rules than academics. Finally, for both government and academic 
researchers, mistakes are thought to be more common than taking deliberate actions to get round 
restrictions on use. 
These perceptions apply to SUFs where acquiring them is relatively easy, for example by download 
after registration as a verified user. There is some support for the idea that, where the effort of 
acquiring the data is larger, adherence to the rules is likely to be higher as the researchers have a 
stronger incentive to protect their interests. One team of researchers argued that the slowness of 
the Eurostat application process provides protection against frivolous or casual access to SUFs14. In 
France prior to the introduction of SecUFs in 2011, researchers wishing to get access to business 
data SUFs were required to travel to Paris and make a formal presentation to an ethical committee. 
In the UK, Census microdata distributed to the universities of Southampton and Manchester 
required certification of IT systems and processes to government secure standards with impromptu 
inspections possible.  
Unfortunately, these perceptions are based upon evidence that is ad hoc and anecdotal. We are not 
aware of any systematic attempt to quantify how well rules are followed for distributed data. For 
some secondary organisations hosting very sensitive data, or significant amounts of data for onward 
redistribution (such as the UK Data Archive), periodic inspections are feasible, but this is not 
generally the case; for example, the UK Data  Archive receives roughly 1,000 new registrations and 
400 re-registrations for its services each month. Most evidence comes from informal visits or 
discussions with university IT colleagues, which is the source for the idea that mistakes are much 
more common than deliberate infractions. The general belief is that researchers try to do the right 
thing; but that they do not, in general, try very hard. 
An important qualification is that almost no evidence, anecdotal or otherwise, has come to light 
which suggested deliberate attempts to re-identify research data. We explore the very small number 
of exceptions in the section on ‘Safe People’. 
                                                          
14
 Hafner H.-P., Lenz R. and Ritchie F. (2016) "User-centred threat identification for anonymized microdata". Forthcoming. 
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Table 2 Distributed data: summary of advantages and disadvantages 
 User Data owner 
Advantages  Access in local 
environment 
 Ability to use 
own analytical 
tools 
 Responsibilities limited to creating an appropriate 
dataset for the environment, and possibly providing 
guidelines to researchers 
 Fixed or semi-fixed costs of producing files can be 
spread out over many researchers 
Disadvantages  Less detail  Cost of producing PUFs 
 Concerns over appropriate usage of SUFs 
 
4.2.2 Distributed analysis 1: online or remote tabulation 
Remote tabulation tools are designed to allow users to create their own tabulations of the data, 
rather than relying on the data owner’s choice of tables or bespoke tabulations.  As well as data 
tables, homologous tools can produce geographical images or time series. What distinguishes these 
tools is that the output statistic is a simple linear value (sum, mean, index) broken down by 
categories under the control of the user. 
The value to the user of remote tabulation is twofold. First, it allows the user to have data presented 
in a useful form to his or her demands without needing to manipulate microdata. Second, it allows 
the data owner to present results from data which may be confidential and not suitable for release 
as microdata, but which nevertheless can produce secure tabulations. 
There are many tools for displaying data using non-confidential data, but relatively few tools which 
can produce secure tabulations. Confidentiality is ensured in one of two basic ways; restricting the 
input or restricting the output. 
To restrict the input, one option is to apply standard anonymisation techniques to the underlying 
microdata before analysis. This is the approach taken in the US Census Bureau’s Table Creator15, and 
appears to be the mechanism underlying the OECD’s online tabulation tool16. The assumption is that 
the data is near enough non-confidential. A slightly more flexible approach is to identify all 
acceptable combinations of key variables (allowing for differencing between possible tables) and 
then only allow any analysis on the confidential data which uses an acceptable combination; this is 
partly the approach taken by the ABS’s CData system (now supplanted by TableBuilder). 
Restricting output rather than input allows for more flexibility in table creation; the web tabulation 
tool at LISSY17 (see below) allows tabulations on the same restricted microdata access through its 
remote job service, and only redacts small cells. This does raise concerns about confidentiality 
breaches caused by differencing (different numbers of observations in tables with slightly different 
selection characteristics, allowing observations with distinguishing characteristics to be separated 
out). Standard rules-based output SDC (see below) cannot address this problem. 
                                                          
15
 http://www.census.gov/cps/data/cpstablecreator.html  
16
 http://stats.oecd.org/.  
17
 http://www.lisdatacenter.org/data-access/lissy/  
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The solution adopted by the ABS’ TableBuilder18 is to add a small amount of random noise to each 
table cell, so that the true value of the cell is uncertain (and the true difference between two cells is 
much more uncertain). To get round the objection of users that adding random noise makes results 
difficult to compare across tables, TableBuilder permanently attaches the noise to the cell using the 
combination of key variables to index the data. Thus the same table requested twice, or the same 
cell appearing in different tables, should appear the same. Whilst these concepts are not new, at 
present TableBuilder appears to be an outlier in implementing them in a production environment 
(rather than as an academic exercise)19.  
Table 3 Remote tabulation: summary of advantages and disadvantages 
 User Data owner 
Advantages  Easy to manipulate data and get 
tables, maps, graphs etc. quickly 
 User friendly interfaces 
 Large number of off-the-shelf tools 
 Fixed cost of producing base dataset 
spread out over many researchers 
Disadvantages  Limited to univariate statistics on 
complex categories 
 Ongoing cost of the system 
 Need to create base dataset and apply 
some form of SDC 
 
4.2.3 Distributed analysis 2: remote job servers 
Remote job servers are a generalisation of remote tabulation tools to allow a range of statistical 
analysis to be carried out on a confidential dataset. Users submit code to the server (nowadays 
mostly through a web interface, but in some cases still through email), which runs the code on the 
data and generates results. These results may then be checked by someone to make sure there is no 
residual disclosure risk; if the outputs are acceptable, they are returned to the user. The RADL 
system developed by the ABS and adapted for New Zealand is an example. 
The best example of a successful remote job server is the LISSY system supporting analysis of the 
Luxembourg Income Study (LIS)20.  This has been providing a remote job interface for over a decade, 
and claims to have serviced over 50,000 job requests; recently a web tabulation tool was added to 
interrogate the same data. 
In theory, the advantage to both parties is that the user can carry out unrestricted analysis without 
ever seeing the microdata, therefore meeting the goals of both sides. In practice this is not the case: 
 Users do in practice need to see the microdata (for example, when creating new variables); 
hence the ABS RADL allowed users to display a small number of records for checking 
purposes, but this meant the goal of not letting users see the microdata was not achieved. 
 Users need to see the results of analysis which might be confidential (for example to study 
outliers); again, if these are not blocked then microdata are visible to researchers. 
                                                          
18
 http://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/censushome.nsf/home/tablebuilder  
19
 TableBuilder is currently being evaluated by Statistics Sweden as a potential service; see Andersson K., Jansson I., and 
Kraft K. (2015) Protection of frequency tables – current work at Statistics Sweden in UNECE/Eurostat Worksession on 
Statistical Data Confidentiality 2015, Helsinki 
http://www1.unece.org/stat/platform/download/attachments/109248612/Session%202%20-%206%20-
%20Sweden%20%28Jansson%29.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1440606581076&api=v2  
20
 http://www.lisdatacenter.org/data-access/lissy/  
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 Developing and testing code is difficult (for example, when Stata fails it just gives an error 
code and does not return the line on which the code failed); hence researchers are 
restricted in their activity in practice, even if not in theory. 
 If code takes a long time to run, researchers may want to store intermediate versions of the 
dataset (particularly during development where mistakes are most likely to be made); this 
may not be possible. 
 The code-input system needs to be relatively tolerant of coding faults, and researchers need 
to be instructed on how to use reference the input data.  
There is also an unresolved theoretical debate over whether code and outputs should be checked for 
inappropriate content and, if so, whether this should be ‘default-allowed’ or ‘default-blocked’. In the 
former, codes and outputs are allowed unless there is a reason to block them; this is likely to miss 
many cases of code or outputs which should not have been allowed. In contrast, the default-blocked 
position (only pre-defined commands and outputs are allowed) is likely to severely restrict user 
flexibility. 
Finally, as noted below in the ‘People’ section, the remote job model relies upon researchers being 
trustworthy. In Australia this is particular problems, as two breaches of the RADL have made this 
contention hard to sustain21. In the worst case, a team of researchers systematically misused the 
facility over a period of time to download data to their own machines. Part of this has been 
attributed to a breakdown in the relationship between the user community and the data owner, and 
two opposing lessons could be taken away from this. The first is that the environment needs to 
strengthened to prevent misuse; the opposite view is that the restrictions imposed by the 
environment created the behaviour they were supposed to deter. 
For these reasons, remote job servers have largely dropped out of the frame for analysis; they satisfy 
neither user not data owner. The development path of Australia (and New Zealand) has not had a 
wider impact (although Statistics Canada has acquired and is adapting the ABS’ DataAnalyzer). The 
US Census Bureau and German NSI DeStatis have supported concept systems, but remote job 
servers have mostly been pushed out of the frame by virtual RDCs. 
In this light it is worth considering why LISSY stands out as a counter-example. The consensus is that 
LISSY is successful because:  
 The data is relatively simple, well understood, and does not change dramatically; this helps 
with the development of documentation too. 
 There is a large and well-established user community. 
 The system takes a light-touch approach to user and confidentiality management (and yet 
still has an excellent record on maintaining security). 
Finally, the LIS began providing remote access to analysis via email long before remote job or remote 
RDCs became available. It therefore had a large reservoir of goodwill when it developed its remote 
job solution, which has become ‘the way’ to access the LIS. This goodwill seems to have been 
difficult to replicate in other systems. 
                                                          
21
 The more serious incident was widely reported in the newspapers; one other was discussed in NSI circles but did not 
have the same impact or publicity. If there were other breaches, the project team is not aware of them.  
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Table 4 Remote job server: summary of advantages and disadvantages 
 User Data owner 
Advantages  Ability to carry out complex 
analysis on microdata 
 Little/no direct user access to data 
Disadvantages  Analysis limited by not 
having direct access 
 Need to be able to code 
and debug effectively 
 Cost of developing system 
 Ongoing cost of the system 
 Not possible to guarantee no direct access to 
data without severely restricting output 
 
4.2.4 Distributed analysis 3: RDCs and Remote (virtual) RDCs 
Prior to remote access technologies, researchers were required to visit ‘Research Data Centres’, 
RDCs: sites located in the data owners’ offices (or controlled and monitored by them). In return for 
physical travel and isolation in a secure environment, researchers were given access to the most 
detailed microdata. Many statistical organisations set up such facilities; in some places (such as 
Canada) the academics took the initiative and secured funding to set up the secure facilities. In the 
US and Canada, geographical constraints were limited by having duplicate facilities set up in multiple 
locations under the direct supervision of Census Bureau or Statistics Canada staff. 
In 2002 the Danish NSI set up the first virtual RDC (vRDC), offering the same facilities as an on-site 
system but accessible from the desktop of researchers across Denmark. This was quickly taken up 
across much of Europe with the UK, the Netherlands, and Sweden being early adopters, followed by 
Italy, Finland, Slovenia, NORC (US), and Mexico in the third wave. Most European NSIs, as well as the 
US, Canada, Mexico, South Africa and Japan, now have or are planning some form of vRDC system. 
Some countries have more: in Germany both DeStatis and the Employment Department research 
unit (IAB) run vRDCs, as did the Bank of Italy and IStat, the Italian NSI. In the UK vRDCs are run by 
ONS, the UK Data Archive, the Tax Department and a network of four universities; the latter are 
exploring doubling up for both social science and epidemiological research. 
Almost all facilities use Citrix ‘thin client’ software (or the Microsoft clone, Terminal Services); the US 
Census Bureau uses Unix to achieve the same end. Most European government-run vRDCs cite the 
Danish/Dutch system as the mode for their technology.  However, NORC is more often cited as the 
technical model for systems set up by academics. 
The ‘virtual’ in vRDC relates to the way it can be used, not the way it is used. The Census Bureau and 
UK tax department only allow access from restricted sites; vRDC technology simplifies management 
but does not necessarily change the user experience. The ONS vRDC, the ‘Virtual Microdata 
Laboratory’ (VML) allows access to users across the UK government network but not beyond. The UK 
non-ONS facilities allow access across the university network, as does the Danish system. The Dutch 
and French systems are unrestricted, although eligibility requirements for international access, for 
example, are stringent. 
Despite this, there are various common features22 : 
                                                          
22
 This data comes from a small survey of vRDCs carried out as part of the project. See the Appendix for specific results. 
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 Most have institutional as well as personal agreements, and both parties are liable in the 
event of a breach. 
 Some RDCs make the same data available to all, whilst others restrict detail based upon 
organisation and user, separating the users into ‘classes’ based on the organisation they 
work for. 
 Most allow the most detailed data to be available to researchers (such as postcode); some 
even allow direct but uninformative identifiers, such as tax reference numbers. 
 Almost all provide training on security awareness, mostly through face to face or online 
courses rather than passive use of documents. 
 Almost all provide training on output checking and output SDC. 
The growth of vRDCs has led to several changes in perspective. First, the level of control has allowed 
the detail of data to be increased. Second, the efficiency gains from principles-based output SDC (see 
below) have encouraged training which emphasise engagement. Third, engagement is also 
encouraged because of the high cost of having untrustworthy users in the vRDC. Fourth, more 
control has increased confidence in allowing non-typical users (for example, private sector 
organisations) to get access to data. Finally, the unrestricted nature of the research carried out in a 
vRDC has led to the new field of output-based SDC targeted specifically at research. 
Two recent innovations have raised new possibilities for accessing secure data through vRDCs. 
The French research organisation Reseau Quetelet developed ‘secure thin clients’ to provide access 
to their vRDC. These patent-pending boxes were designed specifically so that they could be plugged 
in anywhere that was connected to the internet, and they would provide a secure end-to-end 
connection, using both password and biometric markers to authenticate.  They have enabled France 
to become the leading provider of international access to a vRDC, and have also been adopted for 
the Eurostat “Decentralised and Remote Access to Confidential Data in the ESS project” (DARA), 
replacing the original plan to build a dedicated secure network23. 
Secure Pod is a complete module, roughly six square metres, which is also designed to provide a 
secure facility for access to a vRDC24. Users enter the pod using a biometric key only at an approved 
time; only one user can be in the module at a time. The module contains a screen, keyboard, mouse 
and secure link, but nothing else, and is monitored by a remote camera connected the vRDC team. It 
was envisaged as the sort of thing that could be installed in a university library where access from a 
researcher’s desktop was not feasible or not appropriate for extra-risky data. At present these have 
not been widely adopted, partly because the underlying ethos of the module is that ‘the researcher 
can’t be trusted’; this is in direct conflict with the EDRU ethos adopted by the Administrative Data 
Research Network team behind the pods. Nevertheless, they remain an interesting option where 
exceptionally secure remote solutions might be needed. 
                                                          
23
 http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cros/system/files/final_report_ESSnet_DARA_20140321_publishable.pdf_en  
24
 Dibben C.(2015) Micro, remote, safe settings (safePODS) – extending a safe setting network across a country in 
UNECE/Eurostat Worksession on Statistical Data Confidentiality 2015, Helsinki 
http://www1.unece.org/stat/platform/download/attachments/109248612/Session%204%20-
%20Univ.%20Edinburgh%20%28Dibben%29.pdf?version=2&modificationDate=1442327968194&api=v2  
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Table 5 vRDCs: summary of advantages and disadvantages 
 User Data owner 
Advantages  Full access to data  Very high level of control and 
monitoring possible 
Disadvantages  Location may not be convenient 
 Some researchers resent restrictions on 
uploading and downloading 
 Cost of developing system 
 Ongoing cost of the system 
 
4.2.5 Analysis services 
Prior to the development of vRDCs, some organisations offered serviced research requests: 
researchers would write code and send it to the data owner, who ran the code, checked the outputs, 
and sent the results back. This was the ‘remote data access’ offered by Statistics Canada, for 
example, or by the ONS Longitudinal Study. 
We note this for completion. Although some services such as the ONS-LS continue to operate, the 
analysis services suffer from many of the drawbacks of remote job servers, with the additional cost 
and delays of everything being done manually. 
Table 6 Analysis services: summary of advantages and disadvantages 
 User Data owner 
Advantages  Ability to carry out complex analysis on 
microdata 
 Access to expert support team 
 No direct access to data 
Disadvantages  Analysis limited by not having direct access 
 Need to be able to code and debug effectively 
 Delays in transmissions 
 Cost of specialist support 
staff 
 
4.2.6 Synthetic data 
Synthetic data developed with the simultaneous publication of articles by Rubin and Little in 1993. 
Both proposed that confidentiality problems could be solved by replacing risky data with imputed 
data that was sufficiently ‘close’ to the original data to allow for valid analysis, but without the 
confidentiality risk. 
A synthetic dataset has the original data replaced by random draws from a distribution reflecting the 
original data. For analytical work, multi-dimensional distributions are specified so that some of the 
correlations between data points are maintained. Multivariate relationships are modelled, and then 
used to generate predicted values. Additional rules can be specified; for example, to ensure that 
gender and gender-specific illnesses are consistent. 
There are two general-purpose pieces of R code around to generate synthetic datasets. SimPop was 
developed in Germany and is being used, amongst other things, to produce PUFs for Eurostat. 
Perhaps more relevantly for DSS, SynthPop was developed in Scotland to produce synthetic PUFs 
from linked health and social care data. 
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Synthetic dataset can be either fully or partially synthetic. The latter will only synthesise key 
identifying variables. The advantage is that most of the data is genuine, and only the variables of 
concern have been falsified. On the other hand, a fully synthetic dataset is easier to sell as ‘risk-free’. 
In fact, synthetic datasets are not automatically risk-free. The rules which specify their creation 
determine how much risk there is. If the aim is to provide a set of variables of the right size and 
shape, then the dataset can be made safe by synthesising each variable independently, subject to 
some logical checks. However, if the aim is to reproduce the characteristics of the original data 
faithfully, the synthesis may not protect data adequately; for example, if the aim is a good 
representation of household structures, then household structure outliers might re-appear in the 
synthesised data.  
This broadly typifies the two directions that synthetic data production has gone. In the US, the view 
is that synthetic data can effectively reproduce original data for research, and some papers have 
been published using this data. Hence US researchers have spent much effort on providing support 
for synthetic data analysis, including servers which will provide confidence intervals around synthetic 
estimates based on comparisons with the original data. These synthetic files are relatively high-risk 
as they are designed to be close to the original data and so, in some cases, even the synthetic data 
are only available through secure access facilities. 
In contrast, European research seems to be heading down the route of making synthetic files a good 
approximation of structure and distribution for the original data, but without any commitment to 
analytical validity. These files are suitable for users wanting to get a feel for the data (such as 
developing code before using a restricted access facility), or possibly even produce simple broad 
totals, but not for analytical purposes. This has driven the interest in synthetic data to produce PUFs 
for Eurostat and the Scottish Health Informatics Project. This is also the reason it was considered by 
ONS in the late 2000s, to produce ‘test files’ with a realistic structure to make sure researchers used 
their time in the restricted access facility more effectively. 
In short, in the US synthetic data is seen as a way of widening the analytical options; in Europe, it is 
seen as helping researchers to prepare for more detailed analysis but not in itself of analytical 
value.25  
4.2.7 Settings: summary 
Distributing data is well established and relatively uncontroversial. There are concerns over whether 
users maintain the local environment appropriately, and some informal evidence to suggest that the 
expectations of data owners are not fulfilled; but there is very little evidence that this has led to an 
unacceptable level of risk.  
For more sensitive data, the virtual RDC is the recommended option. These have been proven to be 
secure, popular with researchers, and relatively easy to manage. They are more costly than 
distributing data but, as described below, much of the cost can be offset or additional gains can be 
realised. There is now a great deal of experience in setting up and running such facilities.  
                                                          
25
 This is of course a simplification, and there is a lot of cross-fertilisation between the two camps. For example, Jerry Reiter 
in the US and Jorg Dreschler in Europe are leading researchers in and epitomise the relevant continental stance, but the 
two also work together. 
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There is no agreement on where the boundary lies between SUFs and vRDCs; how much risk should 
there be in the data before access needs to be controlled? However, most vRDCs now are expected 
to hold, by default, detailed data with little or no confidentiality adjustment apart from basic de-
identification; there is strong evidence to support the contention that these are very low risk 
facilities, even when training is not up to international standards. Where desktop access to a vRDC is 
allowed, detailed SUFs are being dropped in favour of vRDC access to the original data; SUFs are 
being pushed towards the PUF end of the spectrum.  
Remote tabulation is widespread with many off the shelf tools available. However, most systems 
have a low-risk underlying dataset. The ABS’ TableBuilder is an exception, not yet widespread but 
attracting interest from international bodies. 
Creating synthetic data seems to be an option for PUFs, but this is at an early stage of development, 
and general acceptance by researchers is currently unknown. 
4.3 Project approval 
4.3.1 Lawfulness 
All project accesses, except for some non-personal data, require a demonstration of the legality of 
the release of data. Whilst informed consent from the data subject is seen as the gold standard for 
research use26, most social science and epidemiological research use relies upon statutory gateways 
allowing access for research purposes. While the wording varies substantially between countries 
(and even within countries with respect to different organisations), broadly the research gateways 
specify that:  
 The re-use of data for research purposes is lawful if the public benefit expected from the re-
use outweighs the private cost to the respondent of having their privacy breached. 
 Steps should be taken to mitigate the private cost to respondents as far as possible given the 
intended use. 
 An appropriate authority which will make the judgment is identified. 
 Only statistical research is allowed. 
Most legislation does not specify much more than that; this is left as an operational decision by the 
authority, which may be a person (such as the Departmental Secretary in the case of Australian 
Public Interest Certificates or government minister in the case of UK Chancellor of Exchequer 
notices) or an organisation (in the case of Canada, the UK - the NSI is the decision-making body – or 
the European Commission). 
Despite this commonalty of principle, actual practices vary wildly. This is true even in the European 
Union, where there are cross-national regulations, directives and statutes on data protection. There 
is very little agreement even on definitions such as ‘personal data’ or ‘anonymous’, even often 
within countries.  
                                                          
26
 See Wellcome Trust (2015, ibid.) for a detailed discussion of the issues surrounding the use of informed consent as a 
gateway. 
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As has been pointed out27, ‘the law’ is seldom unambiguous and closed to interpretation, particularly 
in the case of data access. This makes decisions on the implementation of the legal framework 
subjective, influenced by the objectives of the data owner. The traditional approach to data access 
begins by asking “are we allowed to do this?”; this makes the law a shield, part of a defensive, 
default-closed strategy. An alternative is to consider the law as one of the tools to be used in 
designing data strategies; the appropriate question is “how do I lawfully achieve what I want?” This 
alternative approach, of deciding objectives and studying the legal framework to see how an 
objective can be achieved, is a key part of the EDRU ethos (see below) but not yet widespread.. 
In summary, the statutory framework across countries is very similar in principle, and often in details 
too. However, actual practice varies widely because organisations tend to interpret the statutory 
framework in respect of their own internal perspective. While ‘the law’ is often discussed as if it 
were unambiguous and inviolable, in practice legal interpretation is at the service of the 
organisation, sometimes as a shield and sometimes as tool. Very few developments in data access 
have come about as a result of the change in the law (France provides a good exception); most have 
arisen from new interpretations, with legal changes following (the UK is an example). 
4.3.2 Contract details 
In practice, almost all data access agreements specify four constraints: 
 which data is to be used 
 by whom 
 for what purpose and 
 for how long 
and two instructions: 
 researchers are expected to act in accordance with standards specified by the data owner 
and 
 the research environment should be set up and maintained in accordance with standards. 
This specification is consistent with a wide range of statutes and operating principles. However, 
there are almost no examples of organisations sharing common agreements. For example, in the UK, 
ONS, the UK Data Service and the four vRDCs of the Administrative Data Research Network share 
common training, common technology, and a common conceptual framework; but access 
agreements for individuals are specific to the services.  
This seems to be because access agreements like to refer to specific legislation, but it is not clear 
why. Very few laws require the user to be aware of them to have force, and so adding specific detail 
does not increase guilt. Indeed, authors have argued that excessive detail on agreements reduces 
the responsibility of researchers, by making the contract essentially unreadable28. An analogy is with 
                                                          
27
 For a detailed discussion of these topics, see Ritchie F. (2014) "Access to sensitive data: satisfying objectives, not 
constraints", J. Official Statistics v30:3 pp533-545, September. DOI: 10.2478/jos-2014-0033  
28
 For a critique, see Hafner H-P., Lenz R., Ritchie F., and Welpton R. (2015) "Evidence-based, context-sensitive, user-
centred, risk-managed SDC planning: designing data access solutions for scientific use", in UNECE/Eurostat Worksession on 
Statistical Data Confidentiality 2015, Helsinki 
http://www1.unece.org/stat/platform/download/attachments/109248612/Session%204%20-
%20Various%20%28Hafner%20et%20al.%29.pdf?version=1&modificationDate=1442327222025&api=v2  
 34 
 
the tick boxes used to accept terms and conditions when installing software, for example; courts 
have begun to take the perspective that these do not count as informed consent. 
In short, it is not clear that any further information is needed; but in practice common contracts are 
limited by a desire for each organisation to have its own wording, presumably to cover it for not 
making users aware of their specific responsibilities. 
4.3.3 Institutional versus personal agreements 
For anything other than PUFs, access arrangements almost always require the individual who will be 
working with the data to sign an access agreement. This may be directly with the data owner, or it 
may be with the third-party distributor (for example in the case of the UK Data Service). 
Many agreements also require an institutional signatory; for example, an organisation must be a 
recognised Research Entity before any researcher can access SUFs from Eurostat. This is common for 
vRDCs, but less common with SUFs. 
In theory the institutional agreement provides an additional safeguard, but it is not clear in practice 
how well this works. Some organisations such as IPUMS29, which distributes confidential Census data 
internationally, make strenuous efforts to ensure that institutional signatories are aware of their 
obligations. This is because IPUMS, being an international distributor, has relatively few levers it can 
pull to control usage; in Five Safes terms, most of the control is invested in the ‘Safe Projects’ and so 
it expends considerable effort in getting the institutional arrangement right. 
Other arrangements are less clearly beneficial. Informal opinion amongst data access professionals 
suggests that generally, institutional signatories are not fully aware of their responsibilities30. For 
example, the penalties for misusing the UK Data Service vRDC include, in the worst case, a five-year 
ban on the institution receiving funding from the Economic and Social Research Council. This is 
sufficient to close down any social science department, and potentially leaves the organisation open 
to being sued by its own staff. However, it seems unlikely that this risk appears in any corporate risk 
registers. 
As was the case with opinions about whether users follow IT guidelines, there is almost no hard 
evidence as to whether suspicions about institutional engagement are well-founded. On the other 
hand, there is also no evidence against, and psychology would suggest that, for some organisations 
at least, institutional agreements are seen as merely another form to be signed. Whilst most data 
owners or distributors offer some form of personal training, no organisation appears to offer 
training for institutional contacts on a systematic basis. 
In summary, institutional agreements should in theory improve confidence in security arrangements. 
However, it is not clear how well this follows through in practice. 
                                                          
29
 www.ipums.org  
30
 In a case personally known to the authors, a departmental administrator refused to accept responsibility for the 
misconduct of a member of staff, arguing that academics were all free agents; and was surprised when his department was 
temporarily blacklisted for failing to take appropriate internal action. 
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4.3.4 Ethical approval, due diligence and the use of precedents 
All access arrangements for confidential data have some form of check on the purpose of the 
project. These can range widely. For example, access to the IPUMS SUFs requires institutional and 
personal registration and electronic acquiescence to an agreement to use the data for statistical 
purpose; access to French business microdata, prior to 2010, required researchers to travel to Paris 
for an extended presentation and examination in front of an ethics panel. 
Less clear is the use of project classification, internal precedence and external due diligence. 
Project classification means identifying ‘types’ of project so that approval processes can be 
streamlined around the characteristics of the class. For example the UK Data Service has four classes 
of project: 
1. ‘open data’ where registration is required for auditing purposes but no further checks are 
made 
2. automatic approval, subject to registration and electronic commitment to standards of 
behaviour and data security, for very low risk (but not public) datasets 
3. mostly automatic approval  with data owner confirmation, for higher-risk datasets, or where 
the data owner has requested final oversight of projects and 
4. specific project scrutiny for access to datasets in the secure environment. 
Internal precedence means identifying similar classes of projects so that decisions can be made more 
quickly following an earlier precedent. For example, the UK ONS Microdata Release Panel does not 
formally have different classes of output, but it has established a wide range of precedents for data 
access, ranging from Freedom of Information requests to the supply of microdata to other 
government departments. Once a precedent is established, projects can be approved by the 
Secretariat without waiting for the periodic meeting of the full panel. 
External due diligence means accepting the capacity of other organisations to carry out due diligence 
checks on the value of projects or the trustworthiness of researchers. For example, in the UK the 
existence of funding from one of the academic Research Councils is taken by ONS as sufficient 
evidence of significant public benefit. In general however it has proved hard for organisations to give 
up their taste for scrutiny. As the Wellcome Trust noted31, everyone agrees that allowing one body 
to check the project credentials and all others to accept the decision is an efficient solution; but 
everyone also thinks that they are the only body that can do the checking. This seems to be a 
particular problem in countries where data is spread amongst federal bodies: Australia, Canada, or 
Germany, for example. 
These three processes are designed to speed up the ethical process whilst maintaining proper 
oversight. For example, the first application was received for the ONS Virtual Microdata Laboratory 
in 2003; it established a precedent for the type of projects which were acceptable for the VML. 
When the law changed in 2008, a second precedent-setting application was scrutinised by the panel. 
Those two applications took some weeks to gain approval; the other five-hundred-plus applications 
were approved in days (sometimes hours) by the secretariat. 
                                                          
31
 Wellcome Trust (2015, ibid.) 
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However, all three options are controversial. Defining types or classes of projects too broadly might 
allow inappropriate projects so slip under the radar. The criteria for precedents might creep over 
time. Third party due diligence might not cover all the criteria of the data owner. 
It is difficult to find statements about the use of these process accelerators. However, anecdotal 
evidence suggests that precedent-setting is the most effective way to make the application process 
more efficient. The reason may be because it allows the streamlining to be hidden. Defining classes 
of users or delegated due diligence highlights the fact that a decision is being automated. If the data 
owner is adopting a defensive position, automation immediately leads one to start considering 
where the automation would fail. In contrast, precedents are not defined in advance; they are 
responses to circumstances and only apply in similar circumstances, and so it is harder to argue that 
a precedent is committing the data owner to inappropriate actions. Setting precedents also allows 
the organisation to learn, it can be argued. Finally, precedents can be a good way of changing 
attitudes; as data owners tend to be risk-averse, the continual accretion of successful instances can 
demonstrate the safety of a process it a way that theoretical arguments cannot. 
Note that the defensive perspective is driving this way of thinking. From an EDRU perspective, all 
three options are valuable and defensible; precedent is a sensible way of defining types and areas 
for delegation, and the acceptance of mistakes provides a mechanism for avoiding creep in 
classifications or precedents. 
So, there is no internationally agreed perspective on what is the best practice for project approval, 
and few organisations state explicit views on streamlining. There is, however, informal evidence that 
this can make a significant difference to the resources needed to run a data operation.  
4.3.5 Composition and perception of ethical approval authorities 
It is increasingly common practice now for ethics boards to represent four archetypes: 
1. Data owners 
2. Independent legal or ethical advisors 
3. Researchers 
4. The general public. 
The last is a relatively recent innovation, and more common amongst data operations run by 
specialist academic groups. The intention is that the external voice allows the ethical committee to 
identify potential problems (in terms of public acceptance of their activities) early on. This seems a 
sensible approach but there is little hard evidence for this. 
The relationship between the ethical approval committee and the other elements does seem to be 
crucial. The Wellcome Trust32 noted that a major block or spur to successful data access in 
epidemiology was the success of the ethics board. A ‘successful’ ethics board understood the 
research environment, the needs of data providers, and the wider public perception; was default-
open (see below); and was viewed by the researchers as providing a positive stage in project 
development. In contrast, an ethics board, which was driven by the demands of the data owner, was 
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 Wellcome Trust (2015,ibid.) 
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defensive in approach and guarded its absolute right to make decisions. This instilled antipathy and 
unwillingness to co-operate in researchers. 
4.3.6 Identifying benefits 
As noted above, laws tend to specify that projects can go ahead if the benefit to society outweighs 
the costs of ensuring that the privacy of the individual is adequately protected. Given that the 
marginal cost of providing the data (especially for SUFs) is close to zero, the expected public benefit 
from a researcher producing some statistical analysis does not need to be substantial. In many 
countries, the existence of a valid research project itself is sufficient public benefit. While any one 
project may not lead to substantial public benefit, overall the belief that research contributes to the 
public good means that there is a positive expected benefit from each project.  
Some organisations specify the ‘public benefit’ effect in detail. For example, both the US Census 
Bureau and the UK tax department require that the research support the operations of the relevant 
tax office – supporting general principles is not sufficient. Such requirements can be interpreted 
more flexibly if the data owner is willing. One organisation required researchers to show how their 
research contributed to one of the data owner’s strategic objectives, but the nature of research 
meant that almost anything could be said to ‘contribute’. In practice, the organisation was more 
concerned that access was justifiable to the general public. 
Use of data by individuals following a specific agenda (for example, a journalist or member of the 
public looking for evidence for a particular stance on migration) cannot be stopped on public use 
files, as by definition they are available without restriction. When the project requires approval by 
the data owner, this becomes more difficult as the act of approving the access may be seen as 
condoning the purpose of the research. Moreover, it has been argued that all research is biased in 
some way; trying to ban some types of analysis is implicitly condoning others. 
To avoid this dilemma over whether and how to limit some kinds of research, most organisations 
publish the criteria for projects to be accepted. The criteria focus on the statistical nature of the 
research, the need for research to be lawful (for example, not breaching discrimination laws or the 
consent under which the data were gathered), the credibility of the user to make appropriate use of 
the data, and any external evidence that the project has been deemed worthy of support (such as 
public funding). The criteria also note that the data owners are under an obligation to treat all valid 
research projects equally. However, most data owners leave themselves some leeway by allowing 
that access can be removed if the user makes ‘inappropriate’ use of the data in some way. 
There are exceptions to the ‘all research is valuable’ rule when private gains seem likely to take 
precedence over public ones. 
First, the use of data by students below PhD level is often taken to have negligible public benefit. 
Master and Honour students produce research for their own benefit which is not normally 
circulated. 
Second, private sector companies might be expected to acquire a commercial advantage; it is less 
clear whether this works to the general ‘public’ benefit. Some organisations argue that, because 
commercial organisations only use the data if it leads to a commercial gain, there should be no 
access. Others have argued that, as long as the same data is available to all parties on the same 
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terms, parties who see an opportunity to make use of that data should not be disadvantaged. A third 
group argues that the public gain can be maximised by ensuring that all outputs produced by the 
commercial firm are made publicly available for others to use. This third option seems to seriously 
disadvantage the private company, which expends effort on research only to see results made 
available to its rivals; but in practice this is less important, as the research process is often as 
valuable as the final results. In summary, there is no clear consensus on whether commercial 
organisations should be allowed access to confidential data, or how to treat the results of their 
research. 
Aside from a general public benefits, more specific benefits to the organisation have been identified, 
particularly around methodology and data collection. At its simplest level, the data owner has 
limited resources to exploit its data assets; more users of the data mean that more should be known 
about the data. This was an explicit reason for the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change to 
create public-use versions of its energy-use data33, for example. 
The more detailed the data, and the more expert the users, the more likely the chance of useful 
methodological input. For example, the UK Low Pay Commission has been making extensive use of 
ONS data, as well as commissioning research reports using those data, since 1998. Amongst the 
consequences of this intense scrutiny have been the complete redesign of two major surveys and 
changes to the questions in a third, as well as papers on data accuracy and measurement error. 
Actually realising these potential gains seems hard. Unless the data owner has a large internal 
research group (for example, as at the US Census Bureau) then the data owner needs to take active 
steps to engage with researchers to get meaningful feedback (as opposed to trawling through 
academic papers to find critiques of the data). For example, both the Administrative Data research 
Network in the UK and the German Labour Ministry Research Department (the IAB) run ‘user 
conferences’ attended by both researchers and data producers. 
Methodological input seems to be more valuable to NSIs and other organisations collecting data for 
statistical purposes. For organisations that mainly accumulate data through administrative 
processes, data acquisition is driven by operational need rather than statistical value, and so the 
commentary of users may be of less relevance. 
In general, while the specific benefits to the data owner exist in theory, empirical evidence of these 
gains being realised or substantial is scarce. 
Finally, it is not clear what benefits, if any, accrue from international users. Such users would be able 
to contribute to methodological issues, but may have less incentive to do so than locally-based 
researchers. However, international users are more likely to be doing research comparing countries, 
and it could be argued that this is even more important than local research to local policy-makers. 
Overall, those few organisations who do allow international access to confidential data seem to use 
the same benefit criteria for local researchers. 
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4.3.7 Need-to-know versus standard datasets 
Should researchers be given access to a standard dataset containing all the data – which may include 
variables of observations they do not need – or should a dataset be defined for a particular project, 
with the minimum set of information? 
The argument for the need-to-know dataset is a legal one. If data are not needed for the research to 
be carried out, then providing those data is unlawful. There is also a confidentiality argument - 
providing more data than is strictly necessary increases the likelihood of an unauthorised breach. 
The counter-argument is that ‘need-to-know’ cannot be precisely defined. In practice, research by its 
nature is uncertain and so what data is ‘needed’ cannot be determined ex ante. It could even be 
argued, to take an extreme position, that ‘need-to-know’ followed to its logical conclusion means 
specific observations should be excluded if they have missing values in key variables, for example. 
In practice, those operating on a ‘need-to-know’ basis (such as the Scandinavian and Dutch NSIs, or 
the Administrative Data Research Network in the UK) interpreting this as “provide data 
corresponding to the selection criteria and set of variables identified by the user as being likely to be 
useful”. In contrast, organisations providing standard datasets (such as the IAB in Germany, NORC in 
the US, and NSIs in the UK, Mexico, and South Africa) argue that a dataset is an atomic structure, 
and therefore the relevant question is “do you need to know the data in this dataset?” 
In short, it is clear that this is a question of degree: given ex ante uncertainty over what is strictly 
necessary, how closely do you draw the lines around what is likely to be needed? 
There are however, practical implications. Extraction of a unique dataset is likely to be more costly 
than copying an existing dataset. Where the datasets are de-identified but otherwise original, then 
creating a file is simply a question of extracting the subset of observations and variables. However, if 
disclosure control is to be applied to the data (to create an SUF, for example), this needs to be done 
for every dataset. An alternative is to apply SDC once to the original data but this is likely to 
overprotect the data as not all of the original data is being released. 
In summary, both models are usually justifiable in law; conceptually the need-to-know model seems 
preferable to the standard-dataset model, but in practice the latter prevails for operational 
simplicity. 
4.3.8 International access 
Very few countries allow international access to confidential data. One author lists as example of 
successful outcomes:34 
 The IPUMS (International Public Use Microdata Series) project www.ipums.org harmonises 
and shares confidential but anonymised Census microdata from sixty-plus countries. 
 ‘Mesodata’ models create semi-aggregated microdata from country-specific disclosive 
microdata with a view to a particular type of analysis. 
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 The ‘RDC-in-RDC’ model allows researchers in the US to access a vRDC at the German 
ministry of labour, the IAB; the Eurostat-supported project ‘Data Without Boundaries’ (DwB) 
expanded this model to one site each in the UK and France. 
 The Dutch statistical office used contractual arrangements within the umbrella of European 
law to allow Italian researchers to have live access to the Dutch vRDC. 
 The ‘Lissy’ remote job submission system allows researchers around the world to run 
queries on confidential earnings data.  
However, the author notes that these are exceptional outcomes, as is the current DSS practice of 
allowing international researchers access to SUFs. In general, microdata have to be fully anonymised 
to be made available internationally for research35. 
An unresolved question is whether remote access to a dataset counts as international sharing. To 
take an analogy, consider someone standing on the shore at Dover holding up a card with numbers 
which could be read by someone on the French coast with a pair of binoculars. Has the data crossed 
the border? Or is it merely an image of the data? 
In summary, there is very little common agreement on whether international access is feasible. One 
NSI told the authors that, although the law allowed international data sharing, the organisation 
didn’t do it because it was concerned about begin unable to prosecute if something went wrong. 
Again, attitudes appear to be more important than any specific legal framework.  
4.3.9 Projects: summary 
Good practice is difficult to identify, as most organisations claim that their freedom to approve or 
deny projects is closely limited by the legal environment. Nevertheless it is clear that it is possible to 
draw up some simple principles which cover all access: 
 Data may be made available for research purpose if the expected benefit to society 
outweighs the potential loss of privacy for the individual, taking into account the cost of 
reasonable actions to protect the individual’s privacy. 
 Data may only be used for statistical research, and the purpose must be sanctioned by an 
appropriate authority. 
 Data access agreements should state the data to be used, the time period, the users, and the 
reason for use, and also that users are expected to follow instructions on behaviour and 
managing their local environment; anything beyond that may be counter-productive and 
open to legal challenge. 
 Identification of ‘public benefit’ is difficult; most organisations make claims for the potential 
benefits but it is not clear how well these are realised; the justification for making data 
available may be more that the marginal cost of providing that data is effectively zero. 
 A positive relationship between the ethical approval committee and the research managers 
provides substantial benefits, as does representation from the general public. 
 Streamlining ethical approval can be done in several ways; using precedents, grouping 
applications, accepting due diligence of third parties; the appropriateness of these 
techniques seems to depend on the institution’s attitude. 
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 All data is released on a need-to-know basis, but there are differences of opinion as to 
whether the dataset or the individual record is the appropriate level for selection; however, 
the practical benefits mean that most organisations take the dataset as the atomic entity. 
 International access is rare, and the examples are largely exceptions.  
4.4 People 
4.4.1 How trustworthy are users? 
The confidentiality literature assumes users are ‘intruders’, malicious individuals aiming to breach 
confidentiality protection for reasons of their own. Several types of intruder have been suggested: 
 ‘nosy neighbours’ who want to find information about family, friends or associates 
 campaigners who seek to embarrass the data owner by proving that security is poor and 
 individuals with a commercial interest, such as blackmail. 
This can be a sensible assumption when developing statistical theory: all models are being assessed 
against a common, if infeasible, baseline36. 
This intruder model is also a common assumption of those taking a defensive attitude to data 
access: if deliberate intruders can be kept out, then surely non-malicious intrusion is guarded 
against. This model has particular power amongst those who do not have familiarity with data or the 
research process, such as IT managers or legal experts. 
However, there is almost no evidence to support this for the research community, despite over fifty 
years of access to sensitive data around the world. The authors have no hard evidence of any 
researcher behaving like the posited ‘intruder’, and only hearsay about potential cases.  
Two responses could be made to this. First, that successful malicious intrusion is unlikely to be 
noticed, and even less likely to be discussed. Second, that past behaviour does not rule out future 
misbehaviour. Whilst acknowledging the conceptual truth in these arguments, EDRU proponents 
point out that placing possibilities on an equal footing with overwhelming empirical evidence is 
unhelpful and obstructive; it is the equivalent of saying that, because quantum theory allows a chair 
to spontaneously mutate into a penguin, all offices should keep bucket of fish handy just in case. 
The EDRU school also argue that this focus on intruders is damaging because it distracts attention 
from the genuine risk. There is extensive evidence of mistakes being made in all systems, and there 
is also evidence that researchers who find procedures obstructive will find ways round them. 
Examples of breaches of procedure include researchers: 
 taking notes from the screen in vRDC sessions 
 using mobile phones or laptops in restricted environments 
 taking confidential data out of the office to work on at home 
 downloading data without authorisation from a restricted facility 
 ignoring guidelines on producing safe output 
 using data for projects other than the one approved 
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 asking those who have access to data to carry out analysis, rather than applying for access 
themselves and 
 retaining data after the time allowed. 
These breaches are caused by: 
 ignorance of procedures or methods to be followed 
 ignorance of the consequences of their actions and 
 preference for taking simplest path to outcomes.  
This has led some authors37 to argue that the ‘intruder’ model should be replaced by the ‘lazy idiot’ 
model as being far more relevant; Eurostat prefers the term ‘human’ model, as being less 
provocative, and uses it in its training38. 
It has been argued that researchers based in private sector companies have more incentives to 
breach confidentiality than academics. Consider this hypothetical example: a researcher working for 
a consulting firm who manages to extract commercially sensitive information from confidentiality 
data may be promoted rather than fired. 
Again, this is a theoretical possibility but there is little evidence to support it. While allowing access 
to commercial firms is not common, organisations that do allow it do not seem to find any significant 
difference between commercial and academic researchers. 
Part of this may be confusion over ‘commercial’ firms. In the popular mind, these are organisations 
such as insurance companies or supermarkets wanting to target individuals. In practice, many 
‘commercial’ firms are private sector consultancies or charities with a research arm, carrying out 
very similar research to academics, and with the same need to protect their access to data. 
Hence, to date there does not seem to be strong evidence that researchers from private sector 
companies act differently to those in academic research organisations. 
Finally, some organisations provide more or less access based on the characteristics of the 
researcher: either the type of organisation the researcher works for, or the researcher’s seniority or 
qualifications. 
There is some evidence that government researchers given access to confidential material are lower 
risk; there is speculation that this is to do with government being a naturally more regulated 
environment than academia or the private sector. However, there are fewer government 
researchers, and some have been involved in breaches of procedure or confidentiality. A fair 
assessment may be that government researchers are ‘safer’, not ‘safe’. 
In terms of personal characteristics, there is little evidence to support the contention that seniority 
equates with trustworthiness. Indeed, many data professionals dealing with academic would argue 
that the more senior the individual, the less likely he or she is to follow instructions and take training 
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well; a PhD student is a much safer bet than her supervisor. Similarly, qualifications have been used 
by some organisations but are not generally seen as good evidence of ability to act appropriately. 
In short, the consensus seems to be that all researchers should be treated the same in terms of their 
personal characteristics; but that government employees might be more used to working under 
regulations. There is no consensus on researcher attitudes, with the EDRU school arguing for the 
‘human’ model, but most data owners sticking with the ‘intruder’ model. 
4.4.2 Can users develop and/or be trained? 
The previous section noted that confidentiality breaches are the result of mistakes or researchers 
avoiding onerous procedures. One solution is to design an incentive-compatible release mechanism 
– that is, one that encourages good behaviour by default. The other is to train researchers so that 
mistakes are not made and procedures are not skipped. All vRDCs now have some form of 
researcher training; there is much less training available for users of SUFs. 
There is very strong evidence that users generally want to do the right thing and appreciate 
understanding the context in which they work. They also react badly to being preached at, 
instructed, policed – essentially being treated as potentially naughty children. 
There is a wide literature on this in criminology and psychology: the two key concepts are 
‘procedural justice’ (if people believe what you are doing is fair and right, they are more likely to 
support you) and social conformity (people will want to work with you if they like and trust you).This 
has only recently caught on in the data world, which is still dominated by the ‘police’ model of 
training researchers: warn them, frighten them, and make clear that responsibility lies with them for 
any wrongdoing. 
‘Active researcher management’ (ARM) is now the dominant training model for vRDCs39. The ‘active’ 
is about actively trying to engage the researcher, help them to understand the concept of security, 
and try to develop a shared sense of purpose. The aim is that the researcher sees him- or herself as 
part of a research community where the security of one depends on the collective action of all. 
The evidence to date suggests that ARM is not only more secure than the ‘police’ model, it is cost-
effective: researchers become self-policing, and willing to work with the data owner. Examples of 
self-policing include: 
 researchers informing the data owners of minor misuse by others 
 a researcher threatening a miscreant with exposure if the latter did not 
correct hi actions and 
 a PhD student setting up additional training in good behaviour for fellow PhDs.  
Note however, that the number of breaches is so small that it is difficult to make strongly evidenced 
statement. Nevertheless, the experience of the vRDCs applying ARM is that the number of breaches 
of procedure occurring on over 10,000 visits is in single figures, with no breaches of confidentiality 
amongst trained researchers; there were however a very small number of breaches of 
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confidentiality caused by individuals who had not been required to undertake the ‘active researcher 
management’ training. 
ARM training is usually delivered face-to-face, because of the importance of developing a bond 
between the researcher and the research manager/data owner. However, there are some online 
courses taking the ARM approach: the Eurostat Researcher and Administrative Data Research 
Network Refresher courses are explicitly designed with ARM in mind; the SURE training is not, but 
covers many of the same ideas. To date, the Eurostat course appears to be the only ARM-consistent 
course targeted specifically at SUF users. The effectiveness of these online courses has not been 
tested yet as these are mostly recent developments. 
Strong advocates of ARM have also argued that this increased engagement can be turned to the 
data-owners advantage. By encouraging a sense of partnership, engagement with the data owner 
over methodological issues or over the publication of results is also encouraged. It is not possible to 
ascribe this solely to the training, as most ARM training schemes are part of an EDRU-school 
approach and so the data owner is also prepared to engage with the user. Nevertheless, ARM 
advocates argue that the training is an important opportunity for the data owner to sell its user-
friendliness. 
4.4.3 When researchers go bad 
There have been some events to provide a counter-argument to the ‘no researchers deliberately try 
to breach security’ assertion: 
 Netflix released user information without testing whether the de-identification was strong 
enough.  
 Researchers at Harvard failed to anonymise effectively recipient data. 
 A lecturer in a North American University asked his students to re-identify respondents in a 
dataset as an exercise [related second-hand - unverified]. 
 A researcher in a north-eastern US town identified a senior politician’s medical records as 
part of a campaign against the release of the data. 
 A researcher given identified data on patients with a sensitive disease used the information 
to try to blackmail patients [related second-hand - unverified]. 
Note that in all bar the last case, the aim of the researchers was to prove that the anonymisation 
was badly done, not for personal gain. Rather than countering the argument that researchers cannot 
be trusted, this supports the idea that researchers are generally keen to make sure that data is used 
safely – they do recognise the value of it, and the risks of misuse. They tend to do things wrong 
because they do not understand either the right thing to do or the consequences of doing the wrong 
thing. 
4.4.4 People: summary 
There is more agreement in people management than on projects. However it is noticeable that 
most of the developments in people management have come from the vRDC world. Distributed data 
solutions tend to rely still on sending out admonitory guidelines on good behaviour with data. 
Common understandings are that: 
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 People remain the biggest risk to any data release proposal , apart from PUFs and remote 
tabulation. 
 Current best practice suggests face-to-face training, but this is only likely to be cost-effective 
and tolerated by users for the most secure data solutions; for distributed data solutions such 
as SUFs, online training seems to be the only feasible option. 
 Most training still follows the ‘police’ or ’intruder’ model; applying Active Researcher 
Management to the ‘human’ model seems to provide better results and is the preferred 
solutions for vRDCs. 
 There are a small but growing number of ARM-based online modules, although their 
effectiveness is still under review as they are new developments.  
4.5  Data management and input SDC 
4.5.1 Confidentialisation and anonymity 
A ‘fully-anonymised dataset’ is generally understood to be suitable for unrestricted public release; a 
‘partially-anonymised’ retains some confidentiality risk and so is released under conditions. 
Producing datasets to a given level of anonymisation is a well-understood practice, having been 
studied for some forty years. There are off-the-shelf tools such as sdcMicro and muArgus, as well as 
an extensive literature.  
Trying to create fully anonymous datasets for public use runs into problems of definition. True 
anonymity cannot be proved for a dataset (unless every record is an exact copy of at least one other 
record), so what is the standard for ‘anonymous’? For example, the law governing the ABS states 
that no statistics should be produced which have the ‘potential’ to breach confidentiality; as 
aggregate statistics have in the past led to breaches of confidentiality, a strict interpretation of the 
law could mean that the ABS is not allowed to produce any statistics.  
German law comes closest to providing a practical definition of anonymisation with its concept of 
‘de facto anonymisation’:  a dataset is assumed to be anonymous if the likely benefits from re-
identifying a respondent are outweighed by the likely costs of the re-identification. In general 
however the effectiveness of the anonymisation is considered independently of the evidential 
likelihood of it being breached. 
4.5.2 Anonymisation as a residual 
Anonymisation is often considered as the key protection technique for distributed data; once it has 
been decided to create an SUF, for example, there is much advice on how to produce a dataset 
appropriate for release. This approach is consistent with the defensive approach to data access: 
anonymisation is there to ensure that even in the worst case of malicious intruders, risk of re-
identification is acceptably low. 
However, some authors have begun to argue that anonymisation should be treated as a residual: 
what to do when you have no better ways to preserve confidentiality. The rationale for this is 
twofold. First, the aim of distributing data is to support research and analysis; anything that damages 
the data is likely to restrict that analysis, and therefore should be avoided by using non-statistical 
protection measures. The second rationale is that evidence should be used to identify an 
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appropriate level of anonymisation, not theoretical issues. This model is recognisably part of the 
EDRU approach to confidentiality. 
Work by the UK Department of Energy and Climate Change40 showed that, even in a PUF where data 
protection is the only option, an evidence-based assessment of the anonymisation can produce 
more useful data with increased confidence in the safety of the data. For an SUF, a Eurostat project41 
showed that addressing non-statistical issues first (the five safes excluding ‘data’) and then 
considering the evidence base for residual threats leads to a substantially different anonymisation 
technique than the ‘defensive’ technique applied before: targeting of very specific threats mean 
much less perturbation, but much better protection for problematic observations. Eurostat, which 
commissioned this re-thinking of anonymisation, has subsequently adopted this approach in a 
second dataset. 
This approach is still unusual; if nothing else, it requires a substantial degree of buy-in from the data 
owner, whereas the traditional defensive approach is uncontroversial. Nevertheless, the existence of 
successful EDRU-style anonymisation may set a precedent for users to demand greater care paid to 
usefulness and evidence. 
4.5.3 Spontaneous recognition 
A frequent concern is in ‘spontaneous recognition’: a researcher looking at the data recognises 
(accurately or not) one or more of the respondents. This is most likely to occur when there are well-
known outliers; for example, in business data, unusual health events, large families in small 
geographies, and so on. Because it is not possible to prove that spontaneous recognition does not 
exist, this can encourage an overly defensive anonymisation strategy. In particular, this is sometimes 
used to justify anonymising data in a vRDC, despite the range of non-statistical controls that are 
already in place. 
Some recent work in the UK, Germany and Australia has focused on this, concentrating on business 
data. Noting that it is equally hard to prove that spontaneous recognition can occur or has occurred, 
and that it does not appear to be unlawful in any case, the researchers have suggested that a more 
useful concept is ‘identity confirmation’: a breach occurs when a researcher takes action to confirm 
or relate to others the possible identification, which is clearly unlawful. This is qualitatively different 
problem, as it is amenable to managerial solutions, not just statistical ones. This was one of the 
reasons cited for the much-reduced anonymisation of the Eurostat SUF42. 
Again, this is a developing field. The consensus among data owners is that spontaneous recognition 
needs to be considered as a risk; ‘identity confirmation’ may replace it, but that is likely to be some 
time away. 
4.5.4 Digital object identifiers 
The practice of giving datasets unique permanent identifiers is relatively recent; it is not yet 
widespread, but is increasingly used by those supplying data to researchers. The most popular 
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scheme is the Digital Object Identifier collection43. The advantages of DOI registration to the data 
owner are that (1) uses of the data set can be tracked more easily and accurately (assuming the 
researcher includes the DOI in the publication), and (2) the management and naming of the dataset 
can be separated from the discoverability of the data. 
For the reader or paper referee, the DOI is actionable; that is, clicking on a DOI reference takes the 
reader straight to the dataset, allowing easier verification or replication of results. 
Giving a dataset a DOI is now established good practice. However, there is still uncertainty about 
how a dataset should be identified when it changes. Should multiple bespoke copies taken from the 
same source data have their own DOI, or should they use the source data DOI? When a dataset gets 
updated, should we treat this as a new dataset, or retain the current DOI even though previous uses 
of the DOI now refer to an outdated data source? These issues are still unresolved. 
4.5.5 Data: summary 
SDC of datasets is a mature field; the only question is the context in which it should be implemented, 
which is outside the scope of this dimension: 
 Anonymisation is well established, and there are multiple tools for creating datasets at 
different levels of protection; as a result, data should be treated as a residual, something 
that can always be created to suit the situation.  
 Most literature and advice follows the ‘intruder’ model, leading to defensive SDC and over-
protection of the data; however, some new developments show that applying the EDRU 
model can make substantial changes to the value of the data without cost to confidentiality.  
 Despite the range of security features for vRDCs, some facilities still insist upon applying SDC 
to the data; the biggest justification for this is spontaneous identification, but there is little 
or no evidence to support this as a realistic concern, and it may be the wrong concept 
anyway.  
 Use of Digital Object Identifiers seems likely to be the norm for datasets in future, but this 
does pose problems if datasets are to be created on the fly for specific projects.  
4.6 Output SDC44 
4.6.1 The origins of modern OSDC 
Generalised output SDC is a relatively new field. Until recently, most SDC research focused on 
tabulations.  However, researchers produce a much wider set of outputs than NSIs, and so the need 
arose for a more generalised solution. 
Safe output is most easily managed in restricted access facilities, where facility managers can check 
all statistics being released and, if necessary, block their release. In other situations, the data owners 
must rely upon the training and knowledge of the researchers. SUFs are often distributed with some 
guidelines on good practice when producing outputs; the data owner then hopes that the user will 
read the guidance and act appropriately, but cannot guarantee it. For example, SUFs distributed by 
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Eurostat come with extensive guidance on what is expected in terms of minimum cell size and 
dominance in tables.  
4.6.2 ‘Safe statistics’ 
Central to OSDC is the concept of ‘safe statistics’. This is a system for classifying types of output 
(such as tables, regressions, or odds ratios), acknowledging that many research outputs pose no 
disclosure risk because of their functional form. For example, regression coefficients count as ‘safe’; 
they pose no meaningful disclosure risk. In contrast, frequency tables are ‘unsafe’; their structure 
provides a clear theoretical risk, and so specific releases must all be checked before publication. This 
allows the data owner to concentrate resources on the most risky outputs. This approach also 
provides a justification for the historical focus on tables to the exclusion of most other outputs. 
4.6.3 Principles- versus rules-based OSDC45 
OSDC can be applied using either a ‘rules-based’ (RB) or ‘principles-based’ (PB) approach. RBOSDC 
means that hard-and-fast rules as to what is acceptable are applied; for example, every table must 
have at least ten units in every cell, and a dominance rule must be applied to every magnitude table. 
This is well-suited to automatic checking systems (such as remote job servers), or where a large 
number of similar outputs are being repeatedly produced (as in NSI outputs). Output checkers 
require little statistical skill or knowledge:  RBOSDC is a ‘box-ticking’ exercise. 
However, the rules-based approach suffers from the lack of context. This typically means that non-
disclosive outputs are blocked unnecessarily, but a more subtle concern is that inadequacies in the 
rules might go unnoticed. This can only be countered in the rules-based approach by making the 
rules very strict, which increases the likelihood of unnecessary blocking of non-disclosive outputs.  
In contrast, the principles-based alternative places context at the forefront of decision-making. All 
outputs are considered potential candidates for release, and ‘rules-of-thumb’ are used to provide a 
first approximation as to whether to approve the output or not. An output checker may decide that 
the output can be cleared even if it breaches the rules-of-thumb; or it may be blocked even if it 
meets the rules-of-thumb.  A researcher can always make a case that a blocked output should be 
released; the output checker should consider such a case, but is under no obligation to accept it. 
PBOSDC only works if both output checker and researcher understand the rules of output clearance, 
and therefore this requires training of researchers. To operate efficiently, thought also needs to be 
given to the incentives for researchers to produce good output, as this can dramatically affect the 
resources needed. However, if effective training can be implemented, then PBOSDC, when 
combined with the ‘safe statistics’ approach, is demonstrably more efficient and safer than other 
methods of output checking. It is also easily scalable, as the bulk of the work is done by the 
researcher who is incentivised to produce good output.  
4.6.4 Current practices 
Currently most vRDCs employ PBOSDC (although a smaller number explicitly acknowledge it), and 
have training programs reflecting that. In contrast, most guidelines devised for circulation with SUFs 
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are implicitly rules-based (in that the guidelines rarely explain how the context is important), and 
focus on simple tabular outputs. An exception is Eurostat’s new online training for researchers, 
which takes its reader through the basics of PBOSDC and ‘safe statistics’.  
4.6.5 Outputs: summary 
Until recently output SDC meant simply protecting tables. Modern output SDC was developed for 
vRDCs, and then percolated outwards, so that there is a great deal of consistency amongst the 
relatively small group of organisations that actively consider output SDC: 
 Principles-based output SDC (PBOSDC) works best for research environments, and although 
costly to train, can bring auxiliary benefits in terms of researcher engagement.  
 PBOSDC is also more scalable than rules-based models, if researcher incentives are set 
appropriately. 
 The ‘safe statistics’ classification can significantly reduce workload and improve security. 
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5. Managing institutional expectations 
5.1 The role of defaults 
Institution attitudes and behaviours are often overlooked when considering the development and 
progression of data sharing. However, these are often a significant barrier to data access.   
Many variables can influence an institution’s attitudes, such as the institution’s reputation, social 
responsibility and influence. When a new or unknown challenge arises institutions will often use 
their current institutional blueprint to frame the situation. This often leads to a conservative closed 
(defensive) mentality, particularly if the institution members have been conditioned to react this 
way towards potentially risky situations46. 
 The defensive mentality puts the onus on those advocating change to justify their position, and, as 
noted above, a literature focused on theoretical negatives makes winning such an argument very 
difficult. The default perspective of the organisation therefore has a significant effect on the 
implementation of strategy. In particular the default-open/default-closed debate directly affects 
how decisions are taken.  
Almost all organisations releasing data today are default-closed in respect of data access. This makes 
sense in the context of defensive decision-making in government, but there seems to be 
overwhelming agreement among public servants that this is inappropriate and default-open should 
be the organisational strategy47. However, very few organisations have actively tried to follow such a 
strategy, ABS being a recent and rare exception. There is therefore a massive disconnect between 
what individuals believe is the right way to act and the way they do act. 
Part of the reason for this may be that asking questions about attitudes forces individual to focus on 
their public service ideals, whereas day-to-day decision-making is likely to be strongly influenced by 
institutional factors. Research suggests that hypothetical questions are not an ideal way to model 
individual behaviour, particularly in the complex hierarchies which predominate in government. 
Nevertheless, the few data access groups that have adapted the default-open model do seem to find 
that staff welcome a positive approach. 
5.2 Costs and charging 
Attitudes to whether data provision should be charged for vary considerably. There are several 
conflicting imperatives; arguments put forward for charging, or not, include: 
 The cost of providing elective services should be recovered from those using those services 
 The full cost of providing services should be covered 
 The marginal cost of providing a service should be covered 
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 For a review of the literature on risky decision-making in government, see Ritchie F. (2014b) "Resistance to change in 
government: risk, inertia and incentives". Working papers in Economics no. 1412, University of the West of England, 
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years. Almost invariably, 90% of respondents questioned about their personal attitude say “I am default-open”; but in a 
follow-up question to the same group, again 90% of respondents say “…but my organisation is default-closed”. 
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 Data should be considered a public asset, and only the costs associated with provision of the 
data should be covered 
 Costs should make a contribution to the collection and organisation of data 
 Public benefit is maximised by not charging at the point of access 
 A charge helps to discriminate between frivolous and valuable projects 
 A large charge might discourage worthwhile projects which have not been able to attract 
external funding and 
 Small charges might not bring in enough to cover the administrative costs of charging.  
As a result, the only consistency in international access is that PUFs are not charged for, as these are 
freely available. Elsewhere, practice varies enormously, for example: 
 In the UK most data access is provided free to users, with central funding covering the costs; 
but the ONS vRDC did charge users a daily rate for some years, then stopped, and is now 
reconsidering charging again; and some data linkage is chargeable.  
 In the US, institutions hosting a Census Bureau RDC had to cover the whole cost of the 
facility, including on-site Bureau staff, which was then recovered from users; a similar facility 
in Canada was centrally funded.  
 The SURE vRDC charges for the level of computing power required.  
 The Dutch NSI’s vRDC charged on the basis of number of outputs, with the first two outputs 
being free.  
There are some consistencies. Where data is together for a specific project (for example, in 
Scandinavia and the Netherlands), this is usually chargeable; where the data is created once and 
then access to it granted, this is less likely to be charged. Were vRDCs have a daily charge for use of 
the facility (and many do), the going rate for this in many countries seems to be about AU$100/day; 
there is no obvious reason for the consistency. 
The question of charging is also complicated because each data access system has its own particular 
costs structure; see Table 7 for some very simple indications of the relative cost of solutions. 
Table 7 Indicative cost structures for access options 
 Set-up 
cost 
Ongoing 
maintenance cost 
Ongoing user 
cost 
Marginal cost of an 
additional user/project 
PUF High None  None  None 
Remote 
tabulation 
High Low None None 
SUF (standard 
file) 
High None None Low 
SUF (bespoke 
file) 
Low None None High 
vRDC High Low  Low-medium Low 
RDC Medium Medium Medium Medium 
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In summary, every charging model seems to be used somewhere; and because a country tends to 
choose a charging regime and stick with it, there is very little evidence about the impact of charging 
on demand for or supply of data. 
5.3 Stakeholder/customer relationships 
5.3.1 Identifying stakeholders 
As noted above, ethics boards seem to be more effective when there is a high level of engagement. 
This holds true for other stakeholders. For example, the support of the UK Treasury was crucial in 
nurturing ONS’ vRDC through its initial stages, particularly when funding was under threat. 
It has been argued that having user groups on board reduces the risk burden placed upon data 
owners48. Typically, data owners carry the risk if a data release strategy goes wrong; if however the 
strategy works perfectly, the users benefit, not the data owner. This imbalance is cited as one of the 
reasons data owners prefer defensive decision-making. Getting the users to actively acknowledge 
and support the risk taken by the data owners may allow the data owners to get some cover for the 
risk, and also be rewarded for taking the risk. While this is an appealing theoretical construct, there 
is very little evidence to back this up. Very few organisations formally make joint statements about 
accepting the risk, and very few data breaches occur, and so the idea of the user as white knight has 
not been tested to date.  
One stakeholder group increasingly seen as key is the privacy lobby. A number of bodies (such as the 
UK Administrative Data Research Network) have ethics committees or advisory boards which contain 
people who, in theory, are fundamentally opposed to the operations being considered. For these 
groups, the rationale for involvement is quite different. Instead of “would you like to help make this 
happen?”, the question is “something is going to happen in some way; would you like to help make 
sure it’s done as well as it should be?” Feedback from such arrangements seems to be positive: 
privacy campaigners have their concerns listened to and sometimes addressed, whereas data 
managers challenged to justify their actions find that the rationale for their work is strengthened.  
5.3.2 Identifying benefit for the data owner 
The data owner is often under an obligation to provide access to the data. However, some 
organisations have tried to reverse the data owner’s perspective, seeing data release as a positive 
benefit. As noted above in the discussion on ‘safe projects’, two justifications are typically made: 
1. Methodological input, with expert data users feeding back information to the data owners, 
and hopefully engaging in dialogue on use and technical matters and 
2. Outputs which are relevant and interesting to the data owner. 
As with many topics discussed in this section, these seem like good ideas but there is very little 
evidence one way or the other for the difference that they make. There are numerous specific 
example of researchers having input into the work of the data owner, but very few organisations 
systematically integrate external users into their internal review mechanisms. Similarly, there are 
examples of data owners requiring non-technical summaries of their work to be written on project 
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completion (for example, at the IAB in Germany), but again it is not clear how well this actually feeds 
back into the organisation. 
5.4 Public buy-in49 
Most data owners are aware of the potential public relations impact of approving access to 
confidential data. Irrespective of the legality of data sharing and the ethical considerations discussed 
by expert committees, public expectations can have a profound effect on the prospects for data 
access. 
For example, in the UK in 2014 a plan called “care.data” was unveiled to improve the use of GP data 
for research. This project became a source of much media interest; whilst scientific journalists made 
careful critiques of the plans, in the popular press it was characterised as “government selling your 
health data to insurance companies”. The programme was abandoned with little serious public 
discussion over the programme’s pros and cons, or whether the shortcomings could be addressed; 
public health professionals reported that the extremely negative reaction has made data owners 
more wary of data sharing generally. 
However, this media storm is not representative of public perceptions. A number of studies show 
that in the context of medical, by a significant majority, the public is comfortable with: 
 their data being used in research, particularly by academics 
 their data being made available to ‘trusted’ organisations 
 broad consent being used to carry out studies, and no need to obtain consent for specific 
projects and 
 multiple datasets being linked to carry out research.  
Very few data owners in the social sciences actively devise strategies for public awareness (although 
health organisations seem to be slightly better at this). Some have strategies for engaging the 
academic community – for example the NORC Data Enclave runs an annual programme of events 
and conference stands for the academic and government community. However, engagement with 
the non-academic public is much rarer. This may be affected by the experiences in public health, 
which show that, while the general public is generally very well disposed to medical research, the 
answers are very sensitive to the way the questions are asked and the wrong answer can have major 
repercussions, as in the care.data case. 
A potential model is given by the Administrative Data Research Network, set up in 2013 to facilitate 
research access to UK government administrative data. The PR team was appointed early, privacy 
campaigners were invited to contribute substantively to the design of processes, and the ESRC 
produced a cartoon to publicise the role of the ADRN50. The cartoon is thoughtfully designed: most 
of it describes the benefits for policymaking and society in general from using this data for research. 
The security of the process is treated in a very low-key manner, as if it were not worthy of attention; 
one would expect the data to be managed to best international standards, so let’s move on. Given 
that the whole ADRN project has much potential for adverse comment, the lack of any such 
comment to date suggests that an early, active public relations programme can draw dividends. 
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5.5 The Nordic example 
An extraordinary system is currently under development in the Nordic countries51. Norway, Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland and Greenland have agreed to allow de-identified register data from the 
six countries to be combined for cross-Nordic research projects. The dataset created for the project 
will then be made available to the researcher at his or her workplace through one of the vRDCs 
operated by Denmark, Sweden or Finland. So, an Icelandic researcher could carry out research on 
Norwegian and Finnish data hosted in the Swedish vRDC.  
To get this working, the six countries have agreed52: 
 a common application form containing the information needed from all Nordic countries 
 a common Nordic security agreement (to be signed by all researchers as well as each 
relevant NSI) 
 an agreement between the relevant NSIs on the data transfer to ensure a common 
understanding of the regulatory environment, including elements on data security and 
 a structure for communication between the NSIs about data security breaches.  
It could be argued (and the management team acknowledges) that this sort of project could only be 
done in these countries. All of them have similar register-based government data systems, have a 
similar legal framework, and are culturally similar. They are exceptionally open to the re-use of 
government data for research; there is widespread popular support for the concept and trust in the 
management of data. Finally, all have similar principles for their existing approaches to data access, 
even if practices differ. 
Nevertheless, this is still a remarkable achievement. As noted above, even agreeing on a common 
access contract has eluded many organisations within countries, let alone across countries. The 
Nordic agreement is up and running barely a year after the idea was considered in a review. There 
are potential lessons for DSS in the way that attitude can bring common goals forward. 
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6. Developing a strategic direction 
6.1 The data access spectrum 
Developing a strategy for the organisation requires combining the operational and the institutional 
elements. To do that, a number of organisations simplify the operational aspects into a linear 
relationship, often called the ‘data access spectrum’ (DAS) or ‘continuum of access’, the latter term 
being coined by Statistics Canada and the Canadian RDC Network. 
This takes as its starting point the idea that the non-statistical controls in the Five Safes model tend 
to move jointly, with ‘safe data’ left over as the residual, determined by the amount of non-
statistical control being exercised. Users care about first and foremost is whether they have an 
appropriate amount of detail available to them (and they may not need very much), but are also 
able to balance this with accessibility. We can then derive a linear relationship with varying levels of 
data detail; the non-statistical controls are embodied in the type of access: 
Figure 1: The Data Access Spectrum 
 
This two-dimensional representation is appealing as it shows how different access systems relate to 
each other.  Ideally it should cover (almost) all of any potential user’s needs, helping them to decide 
how much detail they are willing to trade off for other restrictions on their research. It also has value 
as a planning tool, by identifying gaps in current provision for certain types of data or facility; and it 
was used as such to provide a rationale for two new facilities in ONS’ portfolio53. 
6.2 Devising a strategic overview 
The data access spectrum provides a simple representation of the operational options available. 
However, a fully strategic approach needs to consider the context within which the operational 
element sits: what is the internal attitude to designing data access and solving problems? And what 
does the wider public think about what we are doing? 
The Five Safes is a useful way of structuring discussions, and has helped data owners to exploit 
developments in technology such as vRDCs. But substantial gains in efficiency and access have also 
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come from changes in institutional attitudes, which strongly affect the way that operational 
decisions can be made. Finally, an area which is relatively unexplored, but which seems likely to 
become more important as access to administrative data increases, is winning the battle of public 
perceptions. 
Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between the elements. This tripartite framework will be used in 
the remainder of the report to discuss proposals, options, and activities. 
Figure 2 Attitudes, operations and public relations 
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Part III Mapping users and solutions 
 
Part II compared alternative data access solutions, and studied institutional barriers to effective data 
access. This was all done in the broad context of international experience. In this part we consider 
the specific case of DSS and its data access solutions. The next section maps the users identified in 
Part I to the solutions identified in Part II. It considers where DSS is currently, and what specifically 
needs to be developed. The structure for part III is as follows: 
 
 Section 7 develops a template for analysing the characteristics of the users, and uses this to 
analyse the users from Part I and put them into three groups: ‘non-expert’, ‘professional 
researcher’, ‘other’ 
 Section 8 maps these groups to particular solutions and 
 Section 9 covers overarching issues, such as attitudes and public perceptions.  
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7. User descriptions 
We begin by considering the groups discussed in Part I in more detail, broken down into three 
sections. The overall characteristics which need to be considered are as follows: 
 
Table 8 Descriptions of characteristics to be reviewed 
Topic Sub-topic Question to be asked 
Statistical 
needs 
 
Likely use What sort of analyses will this group run, in general? 
Need for detailed categories How interested will they be in the more complex categories in the data? 
Limits on 
usage 
 
 
 
Willing to travel to approved site Is the user willing to physically travel to a site to get access? 
Availability of funding Is the user able and willing to pay for access, including the costs of travel to 
sites? 
Can wait for access to be approved? Is a slow application process (days or weeks, rather than minutes) likely to 
turn off users? 
Will wait for results to be released If requested analyses are not instantly available, does this discourage users? 
Skills 
 
 
Knowledge of DSS data Will the user know what data they are looking at? 
Statistical skills Will the user know how to interpret or manipulate the data correctly? 
Support needed on… On what topics are they likely to ask for support? 
Benefit to 
DSS 
 
Research likely to be of value to 
DSS? 
Is the analysis likely to be of direct interest to DSS? 
Can contribute to DSS 
methodology? 
Is the user's perspective likely to usefully inform DSS' methodology (ie what 
benefits can DSS get)? 
Contracting 
 
 
 
 
Willingness to register Can we expect the user to register themselves? 
Identity confirmable Can we set up systems to reliably confirm the user’s identity? 
Personal contract Is a contract with the user feasible? 
Personal and institutional contract Is a contract with both the user's home organisation and the user feasible? 
Accreditation from other bodies Can we rely upon/remove accreditation from bodies other than DSS? 
Incentives 
 
 
 
 
 
Identifiable repeat user Is this user likely to be a regular user? 
Relevance of legal sanction Will legal sanctions be seen as important by this user? 
Relevance of employment sanction Can actions be taken to reduce the user's employment prospects? 
Relevance of funding sanctions Can action be taken to restrict the user's access to research funds? 
Relevance of access sanction Can action be taken to restrict the user's access to DSS or other data? 
Relevance of reputation Is the user's professional reputation important? 
Options 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Distributed PUF Fully anonymised data, unrestricted circulation 
Distributed SUF De-identified, partially but not fully anonymised, restricted circulation 
Remote access SecUF De-identified data available only through secure link to virtual RDC 
Remote tabulation Live tabulation server with confidentiality protection 
Remote job submission Access to run code on de-identified, possibly partially anonymised data 
Secure pods Access to SecUF via virtual RDC from dedicated secure physical space 
Physical RDC Access to SecUF from DSS RDC 
In-posting Access to DSS facilities on-site 
Precedents Are there useful precedents from Australia or other international practice for 
the proposed solution? 
Training Compulsory? Should compulsory training be required? 
  Purpose of training What is the aim of the training? 
  Delivery What delivery methods are preferred? 
  Content What is the content of the training? 
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7.1 The ‘non-expert’ group 
The first group is the ‘non-expert’ group: the general public, journalists and non-PhD students. While 
there may be considerable expertise in the group about DSS activities we assume that this group will 
not be interested in statistical detail. The main focus will be on relatively simple statistics, delivered 
quickly on an ad-hoc basis. Undergraduate and Master’s students are likely to be interested in 
microdata but do not require access to detailed data. 
Table 9 Characteristics of the 'non-expert' group 
 General public Journalists Honours & Masters students 
Statistical needs Likely use Simple tabulations Complex tabulations Microdata for analysis 
  Need for detailed categories No No No 
Limits on usage Willing to travel to approved site No No No 
  Availability of funding No Yes No 
  Can wait for access to be 
approved? 
No No No 
  Will wait for results to be 
released 
No No Yes 
Skills Knowledge of DSS data Little Good Little 
  Statistical skills None None Basic 
  Support required for metadata Yes Yes Yes 
Benefit to DSS Likelihood of value to DSS? No Probably not No 
  Contribution to methodology? No Yes No 
Contracting Willingness to register Yes Yes Yes 
  Identity confirmable No Yes Yes 
  Personal contract No Possibly Possibly 
  Personal and institutional 
contract 
No Possibly No 
  Accreditation from other bodies No No No 
Incentives Identifiable repeat user No Possibly No 
  Relevance of legal sanction No Yes Yes 
  Relevance of employment 
sanction 
No No No 
  Relevance of funding sanctions No No No 
  Relevance of access sanction No No No 
  Relevance of reputation No No No 
Options Distributed PUF No Yes Main 
  Distributed SUF No  No  No  
  Remote access SecUF No No No  
  Remote tabulation Main Main Yes 
  Remote job submission No  No  No  
  Secure pods No  No  No  
  Physical RDC No  No  No  
  In-posting No  No  No  
Precedents UKDA, TableBuilder TableBuilder UKDA, TableBuilder 
Training Compulsory? Optional Optional optional 
  Purpose of training Understand DSS 
activities 
Understand DSS 
activities 
Understand DSS activities 
  Delivery Online Online Online 
  Content DSS data DSS data DSS data 
 
For the non-expert group, speed of service is essential. The lack of reliable identification of users and 
the inability to have contracts or effective sanctions means that DSS has very few options to control 
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use of the data. PUFs and remote tabulation appears to meet the user needs. Optional training 
might secure some additional benefit to DSS by encouraging knowledge and understanding of DSS 
activities – and could play a role in engaging the wider public; see below - but there is limited chance 
for DSS to engage with and gain from this user group. 
7.2 The ‘professional research’ group 
This group comprises PhD students, academics at higher education and research institutes, and 
researchers in government departments (we do not distinguish between federal and state 
government, although we understand there are legal implications). 
This group is assumed to be statistically expert and interested enough in DSS activities to become 
expert in those as well; willing to invest time and money in gaining access if the data quality merits 
it; amenable to good-practice security training; and willing to engage with DSS in methodological 
discussion or dissemination strategies. Not all academics are keen to engage with data providers, but 
as the international review showed, academic disengagement seems to be more a sin of omission 
rather than commission: communication channels not suited to academic interests tend to be 
ignored, even if there is a compulsory element to reporting. 
Two key features of this group are: 
1. the likelihood of repeated and long-term engagement and 
2. a wide range of sanctions (law, employment, reputation, funding, access) available in the 
event of any breach of procedures or confidentiality.  
In theory, this makes these users ideal candidates for the distribution of very detailed SUFs, as the 
users have a strong incentive to look after the data and communicate with DSS. Unfortunately, the 
certainty of mistakes in following procedures makes this a high-risk strategy. Hence most recent 
work has gone into developing vRDCs which give local-like access but without the data being local. 
Less detailed SUFs then provide a complementary service to those who do not need access to the 
complete data.  
As noted in the review, training is increasingly seen as the key battleground to win ‘hearts and 
minds’ of researchers; in particular, selling the idea that the restrictions are a positive thing because 
they help to protect the researcher from committing crimes accidentally. This is where the strategy 
of engagement with DSS starts, and hence for this group face-to-face training is universally adopted. 
  
 61 
 
 
Table 10 Characteristics of the 'professional researcher' group 
Group PhDs Academics (university and 
research institutes) 
Government researchers 
Statistical 
needs 
Likely use Microdata for 
analysis 
Microdata for analysis Tabulations, microdata 
  Need for detailed 
categories 
Yes Yes Yes 
Limits on 
usage 
Willing to travel to 
approved site 
Yes Yes Yes 
  Availability of funding No Yes Yes 
  Can wait for access to be 
approved? 
Yes Yes Yes 
  Will wait for results to be 
released 
Yes Yes Yes 
Skills Knowledge of DSS data Very good Very good Very good 
  Statistical skills Fully 
competent 
Fully competent Fully competent 
  Support needed on… data detail data detail data detail 
Benefit to 
DSS 
Research likely to be of 
value to DSS? 
Yes Yes Yes 
  Can contribute to DSS 
methodology? 
No Yes Yes 
Contracting Willingness to register Yes Yes Yes 
  Identity confirmable Yes Yes Yes 
  Personal contract Yes Yes Yes 
  Personal and institutional 
contract 
Possibly Yes Yes 
  Accreditation from other 
bodies 
Yes Yes Yes 
Incentives Identifiable repeat user Yes Yes Yes 
  Relevance of legal sanction Yes No Yes 
  Relevance of employment 
sanction 
No Yes Yes 
  Relevance of funding 
sanctions 
No Yes Yes 
  Relevance of access 
sanction 
No Yes Yes 
  Relevance of reputation Yes Yes Yes 
Options Distributed PUF Yes Yes Yes 
  Distributed SUF Yes Yes Yes 
  Remote access SecUF Main Main Main 
  Remote tabulation Yes Yes Yes 
  Remote job submission No  No  No  
  Secure pods Yes Yes No 
  Physical RDC No  No  No  
  Inposting No  No  No  
Precedents Many places, 
not all 
Everywhere MADIP, VML, ABS 
Training Compulsory? Yes Yes Yes 
  Purpose of training Engagement 
and security 
Engagement and security Engagement and security 
  Delivery Face-to-face Face-to-face Face-to-face 
  Content DSS data, 
policy, security 
DSS data, policy, security DSS data, policy, security 
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7.3 The ‘other researchers’ 
The third group comprises private sector researchers and foreign researchers. We assume these two 
groups have the same skills as the Australian public-sector researchers, but these two groups are 
treated differently as there are concerns about the incentives for this group and the effectiveness of 
sanctions; in the case of overseas researchers, there is also the question about the legality of cross-
border data access and the jurisdiction of contracts. 
Table 11 Characteristics of the 'other researcher' group 
Group Private sector researchers Foreign researchers 
Statistical needs Likely use Tabulations, microdata Tabulations, 
microdata 
  Need for detailed categories Yes Yes 
Limits on usage Willing to travel to approved site Yes No 
  Availability of funding Yes Yes 
  Can wait for access to be approved? Yes Yes 
  Will wait for results to be released Yes Yes 
Skills Knowledge of DSS data Very good Good 
  Statistical skills Fully competent Fully competent 
  Support needed on… data detail data detail 
Benefit to DSS Research likely to be of value to DSS? Yes Yes 
  Can contribute to DSS methodology? Yes No 
Contracting Willingness to register Yes Yes 
  Identity confirmable Yes Yes 
  Personal contract Possibly No 
  Personal and institutional contract Yes Yes 
  Accreditation from other bodies Yes Yes 
Incentives Identifiable repeat user Yes Possibly 
  Relevance of legal sanction Yes No 
  Relevance of employment sanction Possibly No 
  Relevance of funding sanctions No No 
  Relevance of access sanction Yes Yes 
  Relevance of reputation No Yes 
Options Distributed PUF Yes Yes 
  Distributed SUF Yes Main 
  Remote access SecUF Main possibly 
  Remote tabulation Yes Yes 
  Remote job submission No No  
  Secure pods Yes Yes 
  Physical RDC No  No  
  Inposting No  No  
Precedents NCLD, UK, NORC IPUMS 
Training Compulsory? Yes Yes 
  Purpose of training Engagement and security Security 
  Delivery Face-to-face Online 
  Content DSS data, policy, security Security 
 
For the private sector researchers, there is enough evidence to support the contention that this 
group can be trusted to use restricted access facilities. There might be concerns raised about access 
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to SUFs where use is unsupervised, but again there is little evidence to suggest this is a significant 
risk. The main reason for preferring SecUFs in an RDC is that private sector researchers are likely to 
be more ‘collegiate’, ironically, than academics and are used to working with data in an 
administrative sense; they are therefore more likely to share access to the data and to focus on 
‘interesting’ rather than statistically valid findings. However, this is largely speculation; there have 
been no formal studies on this topic, and this may reflect the prejudices of the public sector 
(including us) rather than any evidenced risk. The public relations aspect of this also needs to be 
managed; providing access to private sector researchers often alarms the general public. This is 
where the secure pods might be appropriate, but the UK evidence suggests that the pods increase 
concern over security rather than diminishes it, and so these are not recommended in the first 
instance.  
For foreign researchers, as well as extra-territorial legal difficulties, there are geographical issues 
which affect the outcome. First, users are unable to attend face-to-face training, and may also be 
unwilling to engage in conversation with DSS if there are time zone problems. Foreign users are also 
likely to be less interested in DSS policy interests then locally-based ones, and hence the gain from 
engagement is smaller. 
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8. Mapping users to solutions 
8.1 The ‘non-expert’ group 
As previously defined the ‘non-expert’ group comprises of the general public, journalists/ non-
specialist business users. For the general public and journalist/ non-specialist business users a 
Remote tabulation tool should be sufficient in meeting this group’s needs. Users can create their 
own tabulations of the data through the tabulation tool, rather than relying on the data owner’s 
choice of tables or bespoke tabulations. Tabulation tools do not require user training, allowing for 
the data to be accessed remotely.  
It is not viable for untrained groups to access ‘detailed’ datasets as this group may not possess 
sufficient research training to analyse the data sufficiently. When considering synthetic PUFs (1) 
there would be a risk of the group treating the data as non-synthetic, and (2) the group may not be 
able to analyse the data appropriately. With a detailed SUF disclosure control also becomes an issue. 
Finally, the group is likely to be very large, and trying to process these users through a vRDC model 
would be too resource intensive from a disclosure and training perspective, even if they had the 
technical skills.  
Pre doctoral students may also use remote tabulation tools, but they may also want synthetic PUFs 
which are expected to have the same characteristics as the real data but are imputed from statistical 
models. There is no disclosure risk from invented data, but the analytical value in purely invented 
data is limited; hence it is useful as a teaching aid but not for research. In public health the value of 
synthetic data seems low given the importance of accurately assessing recording health events; 
however, synthetic data have been used in data fusion models to generate simulation models for 
policy analysis which can be relevant for pre doctoral students. Both tabulation tools and synthetic 
PUFs do not require user training, allowing for the data to be accessed remotely without limit. 
8.2 The ‘professional research’ group 
This group comprises PhD students, academics at higher education and research institutes, and 
researchers in government departments. In practice this group will require access to the full 
spectrum of data, from basic tabulated data to SUFs to full detail in the vRDC.  
For this group it is important that the whole range of options is available. Not all academics need all 
levels of data, and academics can discriminate. The basic ‘rule of thumb’ used by the UK Data Service 
is something like: 
1 vRDC project = 10 SUF projects = 100 open data downloads. 
For this group we would expect the full detail to be available in the vRDC, given other controls and 
the experience of academics working in vRDCs in other countries. SUFs should also be available, 
created once rather than for each project; these are likely to be lower cost for DSS, and so it would 
be desirable to direct users to these if they do not need to full SecUF detail. It might also be worth 
considering whether multiple different ‘levels’ of SUFS are necessary, perhaps with slightly more or 
less stringent approval requirements. 
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The group of researchers would be expected to undergo and appreciate the importance of training 
in using confidential data. For the vRDC users, face-to-face training should be required; this does 
require additional time and cost given Australia’s geography, but should be seen (and sold) as an 
investment by both parties. For SUFs, a modern on-line training program such as the Eurostat or 
SURE modules should be sufficient. 
8.3 The ‘other researchers’ 
Once the infrastructure for the other groups is set up, this group can be thought of as the 
‘professional researchers’ group but with extra restrictions, for example reflecting public concerns 
about access for private companies. Hence we do not devise any new solutions for this group, but 
suggest that DSS might consider whether it is comfortable with this group having access to data at 
the same level of detail as the other group. 
8.4 Summary: user-solution map 
Table 12 below summarises our mapping of the user requirements and feasible solutions. It also 
suggests a preferred ‘order’ if one data access mechanism were to be tackled at once. In the next 
section, it is assumed that teams could be working on multiple solutions at a point in time. 
Table 12 User-solution map 
Proposed solutions Synthetic 
PUFs 
SUFs vRDC TableBuilder 
Population  general public    Y 
 journalists/non-
specialist business 
   Y 
 pre-doctoral 
students 
Y   Y 
 doctoral students Y y Y Y 
 academic/gov 
researchers 
Y y y Y 
 international 
researchers 
Y y y Y 
 specialist business 
researchers 
Y y y Y 
      
Timing Priority Last Third First  Second 
 Rationale lowest 
value user 
group 
Something in 
place already 
works 
The most 
controversial; get 
it right first 
Existing solution 
works outside DSS; 
need to integrate 
re-use 
Information required to set up 
solution 
Demand for 
synthetic 
data 
Set of (minimal) 
appropriate 
SUFs to create 
 
Willingness to 
pay for data 
Set of (minimal) 
appropriate 
SecUFs to create 
 
Willingness to pay 
for access 
Demand for live 
tabulation 
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Given our proposed priorities and the existence of SUFs at the moment, we would see the DAS 
evolving over time as follows, so that within a couple of years DSS has a complete suite of data 
access options available to the different groups: 
Figure 3 Completing the data access spectrum for DSS 
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9. Overarching issues 
The previous section covered practicalities of specific solutions. This section addresses the 
overarching issues which relate to DSS’ general strategy. 
9.1 Common operational issues 
There are a number of operational issues which are better tackled as a corporate issue rather than 
being related to specific solutions. 
9.1.1 Mechanics of access and personal agreements 
Currently DSS has different applications arrangements and access agreements depending on the 
type of access. It should be feasible to streamline these significantly, for example by having a single 
landing page on the website for those requiring access to microdata or bespoke tabulations. This 
would include information on the criteria for a successful application. A model might be the Eurostat 
microdata website. 
It was noted earlier that there is a tendency for access agreements to include excessive amounts of 
information, and that a simpler version would be no less binding in law but should be more 
defensible. DSS has the opportunity to draft a simple access agreement which could be used for all 
its data access operations. For example, consider the sample access agreement text in Figure 4 
below. This text has been designed to reproduce the messages from training, in language that is 
relevant to the users. Points to note are: 
 The aim is to encourage good behaviour, rather than threatening users: “I must…” instead of 
“you must not…” 
 The references to DSS could be replaced by ‘the data owner’ or some other wording that 
would make this generic across Australian government departments.  
 The references to mistake reflect specific provisions in the laws covering DSS data; however, 
they are really there to demonstrate understanding of human frailty and the adult line taken 
by DSS.  
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Figure 4 Simplified access agreement text 
 
9.1.2 Ethical and operational approval 
Ethical approval arrangements are not clear within DSS and there is no overarching mechanism for 
ensuring that data access requests are directed to the right access arrangement and do not cause 
conflict (for example, having a valid public benefit in one case but not another). 
A potential model for microdata approval might be the ONS’ Microdata Release Panel, which has 
oversight of all requests for microdata from ONS. It keeps this manageable by the (informal) use of 
classes of data access and the (formal) use of precedent.  
  
I, [researcher name], have been granted access to the following dataset(s) for the purpose of project 
[project reference] for the period [period]. 
[list of datasets] 
I understand that: 
 I must only use the data for the purposes and period specified in the project application 
 I must only discuss details of the data with my co-researchers listed on the project application 
 I must only share the data with those listed on the project application as having approved access 
to unit record data 
 I must not link other unit record data to these data without prior approval 
 I must apply appropriate statistical disclosure control techniques to my outputs, as specified in 
my training 
 I must follow all instructions about data handling as given in my training 
 If I make a mistake in any areas of data handling, this will not be penalised as long as (1) I notify 
DSS as soon as is practical after discovering the mistake and take remedial action as requested (2) 
I do not repeat the mistake. 
 If I observe others handling data inappropriately, I must notify DSS; if I observe others making 
mistakes in data handling, I may encourage them to report themselves to DSS, and I need only 
inform DSS if the other parties do not do so 
 Any changes to data handling (that is, different people on the project, a different purpose, a 
different period of access, or a different dataset) must be agreed with DSS team in advance of 
acting on those changes and 
 Where any uncertainty exists, or if I need specific guidance, I should contact DSS team for 
clarification. 
I also understand that:  
 Access to data for research is a public good which must be protected 
 As a researcher, I am in a position of trust for which I have received training 
 Any breach of access conditions may lead to a combination of legal, financial and operational 
sanctions against myself and my institution and 
 My institution will be involved in any breach of access conditions where sanctions are applied.  
Signed:  
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An approval process wanting to follow best practice could also: 
 take the position that the default assumption is the project will be approved; the role of the 
approvals panel is to check that there are no reasons why the project should not go ahead, 
and suggest solutions if necessary 
 allow delegation of approval in certain circumstances, such as minor changes to project 
specification, extensions to the timetable or researchers involved, or a project very similar to 
a precedent 
 identify where external approval (for example, from health service ethical boards) will be 
accepted and 
 put information about all of this on the DSS website.  
9.1.3 Institutional access agreements 
DSS has expressed an interest in having institutional access agreements as well as individual ones. 
This would be supported by international experience although, as Part II noted, there is very little 
evidence to suggest that researchers or institutional administrators are aware of the implications of 
such an agreement. 
DSS, and the wider Australian Government, could help to define good practice by trying to develop 
in institutional administrators the same sort of active engagement that is desired of researchers. For 
example, it should be feasible to develop a training course when an institutional agreement is first 
signed; the institution and DSS could share information on activity; and the administrator could 
provide perhaps a short annual statement of accession to various standards. 
A system such as this implies a trained cadre of institutional staff, whom we will refer to as 
“Institutional Responsible Officers” (IROs). Identifying individuals might be problematic, particularly 
in universities. Academics generally tend to avoid posts with an administrative element, and there 
would be a natural tendency for universities to appoint a data protection officer to this post, 
whereas the recent experience shows that having research-active staff involved in administration is 
one of the most effective ways of keeping the project user-centred and developing new ideas. One 
solution would to use the training for IROs to develop sense of the community responsibility of the 
role.  
As there is no precedent for this, DSS would be pathfinding for others, and there are likely to be 
numerous problems. However, it would demonstrate DSS’ commitment to actively managing risks, 
rather than relying on the ticking of boxes. 
9.1.4 Charging policy 
As noted above, there is no international consistency on charging. Our suspicion is that unless the 
full cost of the service is to be recovered, the arguments for central funding (that is, free at the point 
of use) are stronger than the cost recovery argument. 
SURE will be charging DSS on a user/project basis for the initial pilot. In the short term, the SURE 
costs can be absorbed into the overall costs of the pilot. In the longer term, this may not be feasible. 
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9.1.5 Data and trusted user maps 
Some organisations have found the Data Access Spectrum helpful in defining types of data. For 
example, in 2010 ONS defined two data types for its own vRDC, the VML, and the vRDC run by the 
UK Data Service, the SDS: 
1. VML data: source data at postcode level with only direct meaningful identifiers (names, 
house number, street) removed and 
2. SDS data: as VML data but with unique identifiers (company or tax registration numbers) 
removed, and no data less than a year old.  
This had two effects. It simplified discussion over what data should go in which facility; and it also set 
a default standard, against which data managers unwilling to release data had to argue. This was an 
important change. Prior to that date, the VML team used to spend time each year arguing with 
divisional data owners whether a certain level of detail was really necessary; after the change, no 
divisional data owner challenged the definition. We would suggest DSS take a similar approach to 
clarify how data should be allocated to the different options. This also helps to plot gaps in the data 
provision: is there any data which is not available in some way? 
9.1.6 Training programme 
Best practice clearly indicates the use of a training programme, for both SUF and SecUF users. In the 
short term, there are several options: 
 The SURE online training provides a good overview of the principles of good data 
management, and is suitable for both SUF and SUF users; on its own, however, it is not 
sufficient for SecUF users as it does not address the issue of the community of users54, and 
the OSDC module is limited and does not cover modern OSDC principles; this is not 
surprising, as SURE is a facility where clients have much flexibility to set up the gateways in 
the way that they want with the controls that they want.  
 The ABS Secure Researcher training does cover all the necessary elements of safe use, but 
not the SURE environment.  
 The Eurostat online training was designed specifically to reflect modern thinking in data 
security (including the EDRU ethos and modern SDC), and was targeted mostly at SUF users.  
It therefore seems that the immediate training needs of DSS could be met as follows: 
 SUF users: SURE or Eurostat training and/or 
 SecUF users: SURE training as preparation, followed by ABS training.  
In time, it is likely that DSS would want to develop training that reflects some of its interests, but this 
does not necessarily mean that separate training needs to be developed. In the UK, for example, 
integration of training across ONS, the tax department, education and health services has been 
achieved, to some extent, by ensuring that a wide enough range of examples is included. 
                                                          
54
 That is, while the SURE training is good on personal responsibility and avoiding mistakes, it does not actively promote the 
message that all users and the data owners have a shared interest (and hence responsibility) in effective data security.  
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Finally, it should be noted that output checkers will require training as well. We suggest joint training 
with their equivalents in ABS would be cost-effective. 
9.1.7 Demand identification 
All the above proposals assume that demand for DSS data products is known. This is unlikely to be 
the case, and international experience suggests that data demand and supply will evolve over time. 
We therefore propose that, in the medium term, DSS begins some market research to identify the 
scope and scale of the market for its data. 
9.2 Attitudes 
DSS has already made strong commitments to the ‘default-open’ and EDRU strategies, and has a 
Data Access Policy which makes many positive statements. However, at present this statement does 
not cover attitudes, and in our view, is not yet sufficient to support those countering defensive 
strategies and resistance to innovation. 
Specific comments are:55 
 Principle 1 needs extra clauses to emphasise uncertainty and judgment, and there is also a 
need to acknowledge that risks are acceptable, and mistakes are expected; the important 
thing is contingency planning. For example, additional clauses could include: 
“Any decisions about data access have costs and benefits. Even the decision not to release 
data has a cost, in that society cannot use that information to make judgements. DSS will 
aim to look at the whole costs and benefits from society’s perspective.” 
“Costs and benefits are uncertain: we do not know how the world will turn out, and therefore 
any decision is risky. DSS accepts that decisions must be made on the balance of 
probabilities, using the evidence available at the time of the decision, which implies that 
some DSS decisions may turn out to be wrong.” 
“Decisions about data access are made by humans, who will make mistakes. It is more 
important that we quickly identify mistakes and learn from them, rather than apportioning 
blame.” 
 We would suggest re-ordering Principle 3 before Principle 2, to emphasise positive aspects. 
 The current principle could establish the default-open status more clearly: 
“Line areas should assume that their data will be made available, and their role is to identify 
how to do this cost-effectively (maintenance of confidentiality is a cost)” 
“All decisions about data access should be based on evidence; in particular, decisions to 
restrict detail or access should demonstrate the threat being targeted and the credibility of 
that threat.” 
                                                          
55
 These comments relate to v1.0, dated February 2015 
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 Principle 5 needs to bring the data user in, so the community of interest is being built early 
on (that is, the “we’re all in it together” ethos). DSS might be legally responsible, but the 
whole EDRU aim is to get everyone to accept some share of responsibility. 
 A start could be to change the title to include “but will seek to engage third parties”, and add 
a clause: 
“DSS will seek to engage third parties (including researchers and policy users of research) in 
sharing responsibility for data releases.” 
 The detail of Principle 6 works well but perhaps the title could be changed to something like  
“Principle 6: DSS favours controlled access rather than distributing data for the most 
sensitive data”. 
 A clause could then be added that distributing data is an acceptable alternative where the 
release mechanism (including but not limited to restrictions on data detail) provides 
confidence that the release is low risk. 
 Principle 7 seems problematic, and liable to legal challenge; it also limits detail by default, 
rather than keeping it open by default. We would suggest rewording as: 
“Researchers will only be given access to the datasets that they need to carry out their 
project. In exceptional circumstances, researchers may be restricted to a subset of the data.” 
In summary, existing policy documents, and statements made by senior DSS staff, provide a strong 
starting point; but some small changes in wording would emphasise the attitudinal change. 
9.3 Stakeholder management 
Given the concurrent developments in other Commonwealth bodies, there seems a strong benefit in 
early and specific negotiations across government to avoid slightly different competing solutions 
being developed. The Nordic model may be a useful guide: agree on the things that are possible, 
allow some variation, and accept that some things will have to be worked out over time. 
The ultimate goal, which may be unachievable in the medium term, would be to have a single 
government solution on all aspects of data access: attitudes, forms, accreditation, training, and PR. 
There is an opportunity to identify gains to data providers, including feedback from researchers, and 
build a system which can exploit those gains. This might include gains from TableBuilder and the 
PUFs, as well as from the hardcore research community. DSS may want to consider how it can create 
occasions for data providers and researchers to meet and share findings.  
9.4 Perceptions 
An early positive (but low-key) campaign, perhaps taking lessons from the Administrative Research 
Data Network, would be useful. Activities of the ADRN included: 
 Production of high-quality information films on the public benefit value of data linking 
 Production of guides aimed at the public, particularly journalists 
 An active public engagement strategy, often in collaboration with the Royal Statistical 
Society and the Statistics Authority 
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 Inclusion of privacy campaigners on the ADRN Advisory Board 
 Regular meetings with the Information Commissioner 
 Regular meetings with heads of analysis at government departments and 
 A dedicated YouTube channel containing presentations from meetings and events, to 
demonstrate transparency in activities. 
We would recommend an early discussion with privacy campaigners and with users, and the 
development of an Advisory Board to allow a forum for different opinions to be expressed. We 
would recommend that the Advisory Board be composed of individuals who have authority in their 
own organisation to initiate change; this will be a key mechanism for helping to disseminate good (or 
at least common) practice across government. 
Both of these activities could be developed by DSS independently, but there are substantial potential 
benefits from developing a whole-of-government approach. We would suggest DSS begins early talks 
with other departments engaged in developing data strategies (currently, ABS, Productivity 
Commission, DPMC) to explore the options for collaboration. 
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Part IV Items for action and roadmap 
This Part details the recommendations relating to the solutions identified. The next section identifies, for each of the recommended solutions and for the institutional 
position, elements which are in place, the gaps, and potential ways to fill the gap. Section 3 then provides a timeline for the changes. 
10. Items for action 
The four options in this section are ordered by our assessment of priority to DSS: vRDC, TableBuilder, SUFs, and PUFs. We then consider the institutional changes needed to 
implement and fully benefit from the practical developments. 
10.1 Virtual RDC 
This project has been identified as the highest priority as a pilot and is imminent. The vRDC is also likely to be the most controversial, and so while this is high risk, this also 
affords the most opportunities  
 Project People Settings Data Output 
Progression Action needed Comments Action 
needed 
Comments Action needed Comments Action 
needed 
Comments Action needed Comments 
Things in 
place at DSS 
not needing 
significant 
change 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Training is essential 
for a vRDC, and is 
the best chance to 
engage researchers; 
SURE offers training 
to its users  
SURE environmental 
controls 
The SURE system works and, 
in the absence of comparable 
systems, should be considered 
for use. There may need to be 
some configuration of the 
SURE environment 
   
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 Project  People  Settings  Data  Output  
Progression Action needed Comments Action 
needed 
Comments Action needed Comments Action 
needed 
Comments Action needed Comments
Things done 
by others 
(not DSS) to 
be adapted 
  SURE 
training; ABS 
training  
 
Eurostat 
guidelines on 
good 
researcher 
behaviour 
Guidelines for 
researcher 
behaviour need to 
be transparent and 
visible; in the short 
term the Eurostat 
guidelines are a 
good proxy, but in 
the longer term 
these could be 
replaced with 
guidelines suitable 
to the Australian 
context 
Creation of SURE project 
environments 
 
Implementation of 
secure user environment: 
locked-down screen and 
session recording 
 
Secure thin clients and 
secure pods to be 
considered as long term 
options for extra-
sensitive datasets 
SURE produces guidelines for 
users; these need to be 
discoverable from DSS website 
   ABS training for 
researchers and 
output checkers  
 
Eurostat guidelines 
on PBOSDC and 
'safe statistics' as 
background 
 
 UK practical 
manual Guidelines 
for output checkers  
to be adopted and 
adapted
In the short run, the 
ABS training seems 
closest to 
international good 
practice 
 Transparent and 
discoverable 
guidelines on 
process and 
requirements for 
approval 
 
There is a need to 
demonstrate to 
stakeholders that the 
projects generate a benefit 
to DSS and the wider public 
      Transparent and 
discoverable 
guidelines on what 
is expected of 
researchers 
 
Training for 
institutional 
contract-holders 
 
    
Institutional 
agreements
    
Personal 
agreements 
 
    
Mechanism for 
research findings 
to be disseminated 
meaningfully 
amongst data 
providers 
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10.2 TableBuilder 
Using the ABS’ TableBuilder allows relatively quick delivery of an additional access solution for the general public, of whom researchers and lecturers are a 
part. Using TableBuilder also enhances the impression of joined-up government, and means that users do not need to learn a new tool. Finally, if both ABS 
and DSS datasets are hosted at the ABS, then users do not need to worry about which site to access. 
 Project People Settings Data Output 
Progression Action needed Comments Action needed Comments Action 
needed 
Comments Action needed Comments Action needed Comments 
Things in 
place at DSS 
not needing 
significant 
change 
 There is no 
requirement for 
project approval 
 Information on why 
TableBuilder produces 
some results 
inconsistent with 
other published tables 
should be transparent 
and discoverable, but 
not actively 
highlighted; this may 
just be referenced on 
the ABS website 
 The local 
setting is 
irrelevant 
for 
TableBuilder 
outputs 
 TableBuilder 
should run on 
the SUFs (see 
below), 
producing a 
balance between 
detail and 
confidentiality 
risk 
 
 There is no need for 
further output 
control beyond that 
done in TableBuilder 
Things done 
by others 
(not DSS) to 
be adapted 
  ABS 
documentation/user 
guides referenced 
   Current ad hoc 
data requests to 
be formalised 
and developed 
as SUFs 
Metadata may 
need to be 
created in a 
specific form for 
the ABS 
 
Mechanisms for 
delivering the 
data and 
metadata to ABS 
need to be 
specified 
  
 
Things to be 
developed 
anew 
 
 
  Guidance on 
understanding limits 
in TableBuilder 
   Delivery of data 
to ABS 
 
Metadata 
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10.3 Scientific Use Files 
DSS already produces SUFs but these seem to be generally on an ad hoc basis. Producing a finite set would allow DSS to exploit economies of scale, and 
they could also be used to supply TableBuilder. We identified the development of SUFs as a lower priority as DSS already has a process that works. 
However, producing SUFs would enable the development of TableBuilder as an additional tool. 
 Project People Settings Data Output 
Progression Action needed Comments Action needed Comments Action needed Comments Action needed Comments Action needed Comments 
Things in 
place at DSS 
not needing 
significant 
change 
Authority for 
approval and ethical 
criteria 
 
 
There is a mechanism for 
project approval in place 
at DSS but it is not 
transparent, visible or 
discoverable 
 
 
The ad hoc nature of 
current arrangements 
may not work on a larger 
scale; decision-making by 
precedent would allow 
the process to be 
streamlined 
    Ad hoc dataset 
creation replaced 
with  fixed set of 
SUFs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The aim is to 
develop a fixed set 
of files rather than 
ad hoc extractions 
for efficiency’s sake; 
this contradicts a 
narrow 
interpretation the 
‘need to know 
principle’, and so 
this needs to be 
addressed 
 
 
 
 Whilst the risk is low, 
good practice 
recommends some basic 
training in output SDC 
 
Institutional 
agreements 
 
Metadata 
associated with 
the fixed files 
 
Personal 
agreements 
 
Create 
justification for 
off-the-shelf files 
 
Metadata 
       Review 
anonymisation 
procedures in line 
with EDRU model 
If current SDC 
processes are not 
based on EDRU 
principles 
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Project People Settings Data Output  Project People Settings Data 
Progression Action needed Comments Action needed Comments Action needed Comments Action needed Comments Action needed Comments 
Things done 
by others 
(not DSS) to 
be adapted 
Approval process => 
approval by 
precedent 
Decision-making 
process/criteria to 
be transparent 
Agreements with 
institutions as well as 
individuals aligns SUF and 
vRDC practices 
Training for institutional 
agreement-holders raises 
awareness of data 
responsibilities and can be 
used to encourage 
engagement in the data 
community 
 
Current 
guidelines to be 
reviewed in the 
EDRU 
framework  
 
Eurostat 
guidelines/test 
to be required 
reading for 
researchers in 
the short term 
In the short term, 
the guidelines at 
Eurostat can be 
used as a short cut; 
in the medium term, 
DSS/Australian 
specific guidelines 
should be 
developed 
Description of 
local environment 
to be reviewed 
for practicality of 
implementation 
and compatibility 
with behaviour 
 
 
Guidelines on 
how to set up 
environments 
should be 
discoverable and 
transparent 
 
 
 
  Eurostat 
guidelines/test 
to be 
referenced 
The Eurostat guidelines 
provide a temporary 
solution, and are 
compliant with the 
EDRU framework; in the 
longer term, specific 
guidelines using 
examples relevant to 
DSS may be better 
Transparent and 
discoverable 
guidelines on 
local environment 
to be drawn up 
Guidelines should 
be reviewed in 
the light of the 
modern approach 
being taken by 
DSS 
 
Things to be 
developed 
anew 
 
 
Transparent and 
discoverable 
guidelines on 
process and 
requirements for 
approval 
Training for 
institutional 
agreement-holders 
Mechanism for 
research findings 
to be disseminated 
meaningfully 
amongst data 
providers 
Findings need to be 
published to 
demonstrate the value 
of research to DSS and 
the wider public 
Transparent 
and 
discoverable 
guidelines 
specific to DSS 
context, 
building on 
Eurostat 
guidelines, in 
the medium 
term 
   Transparent 
(except with 
reference to 
specific 
parameters) and 
discoverable 
guidance on how 
the SUFs were 
created 
 Transparent 
and 
discoverable 
guidelines 
specific to DSS 
context, 
building on 
Eurostat 
guidelines 
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10.4 Public use files 
This project has been identified as the lowest priority. PUFs provide an additional way for users to get access to data. Synthetic data can be a very cost-
effective way of getting minimal-risk datasets which behave somewhat similarly to the source data; it also means the data can have the same structure as 
the underlying data, so users of the vRDC, for example, can develop their code off-site on the synthetic data. The alternative, anonymisation of source data 
is more likely to be complex and expensive if any consideration is taken of the user. However, the creation of synthetic PUFs is a relatively new field and 
there is not much evidence yet on how the user community reacts to them. Therefore this element is a long-term option for DSS. 
 Project People Settings Data Output 
Progression Action needed Comments Action needed Comments Action 
needed 
Comments Action needed Comments Action 
needed 
Comments 
Things in 
place at DSS 
not needing 
significant 
change 
 Not relevant  It should be emphasised 
to users that the data is 
all imputed, and hence 
should not be used as 
exact data 
 Not relevant  This would be a new departure for 
DSS, but seems to offer good 
cost/benefit ratios, compared to 
anonymisation to create ‘traditional’ 
PUFs 
 Not relevant 
Things done 
by others 
(not DSS) to 
be adapted 
          
 
Things to be 
developed 
anew 
 
 
  Guidance on 
using/interpreting 
synthetic data 
   Synthetic dataset    
 80 
 
10.5 Institutional components 
In this subsection we consider the activities which need to occur at the institutional level (or indeed across the whole of government). The rationale for 
specific items are not given as it should mostly be self-explanatory; however the overarching reasons are: 
 A commitment by DSS to a “pro-access” attitude, which will influence: design, implementation and delivery of systems; the more the new system 
deviates from what is already in place, the more clear leadership helps 
 Principles can provide common ground and a basis for discussion where ideas of implementation differ strongly and 
 Engaging stakeholders (including the public) early and meaningfully improves the prospect of success.  
This is a unique time in the development of Australia’s infrastructure, and co-operation and the identification of common problems may allow much more 
cost-effective and sustainable gains than separate solutions for each Department.  
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Attitudes Stakeholder Management Perceptions Common Operational Issues 
Aim Action Aim Action Aim Action Aim Action 
Formal 
commitment 
of DSS to 
EDRU 
approach 
Redraft and circulate policy 
statement from DSS 
management with additional 
attitudinal elements 
 
Develop brief guide for staff 
on intranet on what this 
means in practice 
Integration with 
other 
Commonwealth 
developments 
Negotiate to adopt EDRU 
perspective in ABS, OPMC, 
PC, AIC and other relevant 
bodies; potentially develop 
cross-government 
statement on perspectives 
Develop common cross-
government documents (eg 
personal or individual 
agreements for data 
access), with references to, 
for example, specific 
statutes separated and 
located in another 
discoverable place 
 
Agree a single (cross-
government) accreditation 
process for individuals and 
organisations 
Develop joint training 
(active and passive) and 
information materials 
Develop 
positive public 
attitude for 
data sharing 
Develop web pages and 
literature focusing on the 
societal benefits, with 
security as an operational 
issue 
 
In the short-term, steal 
the ESRC cartoon; in the 
longer term, develop 
some similar publicity for 
Australia 
Develop a 
streamlined 
transparent 
application and 
data access 
process 
Streamline applications so it is 
dependent on the amount of 
detailed data the institute/ 
researcher requires. 
 
Provide information on the 
criteria for a successful 
application on DSS website. 
 
Develop an overarching model 
for ethical/ operational 
approval for microdata access/ 
release. 
 
Utilise current training 
programmes (such as SURE and 
Eurostat) for researchers.  
Avoiding 
defensive 
decision-
making 
Develop formal corporate 
advice that 
o objectives and attitudes 
must be agreed in 
advance of specific 
discussions about 
legal/technical feasibility 
o (potential) users must 
have a substantive input 
when setting objectives 
o the risks/costs of not 
going ahead with projects 
(including to the wider 
public, not just DSS) must 
be considered 
     user representatives must 
acknowledge risks, and 
contribute substantively 
to the risk management 
plan 
Obtain positive 
engagement 
from data 
providers 
Hold early talks with data 
providers inside and 
outside DSS, deploying 
evidence to counter 
opposition 
 
Identify gains to data 
providers, including 
feedback from researchers 
Create occasions for data 
providers and researchers 
to meet and share findings 
(DSS attendance at 
academic conferences; 
webinars by DSS aimed at 
academics) 
Address 
concerned 
groups head-on 
Invite privacy groups to 
early meetings, focusing 
on the 'if you don't do it 
this way, then how?' 
argument 
 
Set up an advisory board 
including data providers, 
researchers, 
policymakers and privacy 
activists 
 
Formalise cross 
institutional 
arrangements. 
Introduce the role of 
Institutional Responsible 
Officers within the institution. 
These individuals will help set 
precedence and streamline 
communications between the 
institution’s researchers and 
DSS.  
 
Develop training courses for 
IROs 
 
Scope the future demand for 
data supply, and also the 
feasibility of charging for data 
access.  
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11. Roadmap 
Area of 
development 
Short-term (1-3 months) Medium term (3-6 months) Longer-term (6-12 months) Strategic Developments 
Public Use 
Files 
None None None Creation of synthetic data 
files and associated metadata 
TableBuilder Terms of use agreed with ABS Delivery of metadata and sample datasets to ABS Delivery of SUF files and metadata for dissemination All 
 
Scientific Use 
Files 
Application process visible using existing 
documents 
Users required to undergo online training and 
take test regarding Scientific Use Files 
(investigate the Eurostat online training as a 
potential option). 
Fixed set of SUFs identified by user demand 
 
Approval mechanism redesigned to establish and 
use precedents 
Fixed set of SUFs created on EDRU basis and delivered to 
TableBuilder 
 
SUF metadata created 
 
Online training appropriate to DSS created 
Review of dataset use – are 
more or less justified? 
Virtual RDC Pilot users agreed 
Hosting with SURE agreed. 
Agreement to require ABS Safe User training 
and/or SURE training. 
Adoption of Principles-based output SDC and 
training of staff. 
Personal contracts written for pilot phase only. 
Detail in vRDC defined but recognised as pilot 
only 
Delivery of pilot data and metadata to SURE 
Approval mechanism redesigned to establish and 
use precedents 
General application process agreed and made 
visible 
ABS training redesigned to incorporate DSS-specific 
references 
Redraft of Guide for Output Checkers in association 
with ABS, possibly specific to Australian use 
Review of feasibility of ‘production line’ for vRDC 
data and metadata 
Review of hosting with SURE, including data manager, 
stakeholder and user views 
 
Review of training effectiveness, including DSS needs 
Review of SURE system, 
training and metadata 
 
Review feasibility of Secure 
Thin Clients/Secure Pods for 
extraordinary datasets  (that 
is, where an evidenced risk 
much higher than normal 
research use exists) 
Institutional 
changes 
Statement of DSS policy (including attitude) to 
data access including formal adherence to EDRU 
approaches 
Top-level data strategy using the Data Access 
Spectrum 
Advisory Board set up and members enrolled 
Review of potential areas for cross-government 
sharing of tools and documents 
Form designed for users to produce non-
technical summaries of research and tested with 
past users 
Default definitions of data suitable for each 
element, with exceptions needing to be proven 
Dedicated area of the website for microdata, 
including publications 
Users required to produce non-technical summaries 
of research 
1
st
 meeting of Advisory Board 
Practical cross-government workshop on designing 
commonality into Commonwealth data access 
Pilot training for Institutional Responsible Officers 
Publicity material targeted at general public about value of 
research data access 
Single register of DSS users 
Joint accreditation of DSS/ABS users 
Use of common documents for all access and across 
government if possible 
 Institutional access agreements 
 Personal agreements 
 Default local environment specifications for SUFs 
 SDC guides 
Statements of data access intention and strategy 
Annual report by DSS and 
commentary by Advisory 
Board 
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Appendix: virtual RDC survey results 
As part of this project, the team asked respondents at 12 RDCs around the world about the 
management of their RDCs. The results are discussed in section 4.2.4 of the main report. The 
detailed results are presented below. 
Question Response  
Who is the data access agreement with? 27% The researcher 
73% Both the institution and researcher 
Who may sanctions be applied to in the case of a breach? 9% Just the researcher 
9% Just the organisation 
82% Both the researcher and the organisation 
Is there more or less detail available depending on the type of 
users? 
55% No difference in detail based on user 
45% Different level of detail available  
        based on both organisation and user 
Are there different classes of users? (more/less trusted?) 55% No different classes of users 
45% Different classes of users based on organisation and 
individual 
In theory, from where can the data be accessed? (tick all that 
apply) 
18% No response to the question 
18% The researcher's organisation 
54% Onsite facilities 
45% Anywhere 
18% Approved facilities  
In practice, where is access normally granted? (tick all that apply) 54% Own site 
36% Approved facility 
27% Researcher’s organisation 
36% Anywhere  
What is the most detailed level of geography made available to 
researchers for business data? 
36% Exact 
18% Local 
36% None 
10% No response to question 
What is the most detailed level of geography made available to 
researchers for personal data? 
72% Postcode 
18% Local 
10% No response to question 
Are unique identifiers available if the project requires them? (tax 
numbers, health service numbers) 
45% No 
10% Yes with restriction 
45% Yes with no restriction  
Do you check all outputs before it is released from the centre?  82% Yes 
18% No 
Type of output checking, if used 45% Rules based 
45% Principles based 
10% None 
Are users allowed to archive their workspace once the project has 
finished? 
82% Yes 
18% No 
Can users retain the code they develop after the project finishes? 100% No 
If the data is created specifically for the project, is it retained after 
the project is completed? 
82% Yes 
18% No 
Is training provided on security awareness? 90% Yes 
10% Optional 
How is the security training delivered? 56% Face-to-face 
35% Online course 
9% Online guide 
Is training provided on using the system? 64% Yes 
36% No 
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Question Response  
Is training provided on statistics eg aspects of data linkage? 10% Yes 
45% Optional 
45% No 
Is refresher training required? 10% Yes 
27% Not recent 
63% No 
Are researchers trained in checking output for disclosure risk? 73% Yes 
27% No 
Is explaining your role to the wider public part of your RDC's or 
your organisation's usual objectives 
45% Yes 
37% Not directly  
18% No 
How do you engage with the public 18% Active and passive engagement 
26% Active engagement  
56% No response to question 
 
 
 
